Come on, Boeing.

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The culmination of promotion and advancement policies implemented at UAL over the last decade or so.
Do we actually know anything about this yet? Is there a definitive causal relationship established?

Even 30-year veterans can make mistakes, get distracted or overwhelmed, and fail to communicate. Without further evidence I think it’s too soon to rule that out.
 
Even 30-year veterans can make mistakes, get distracted or overwhelmed, and fail to communicate.
A robust safety regimen does not let the above, if it happens, result in a failure. You have layers of prevention and detection in place to prevent a root cause from escaping to a failure of high severity. When a cluster of incidents happens in a short time in one airline, that suggests the control plans designed to prevent these incidents have somehow become ineffective.

Edit: When control plans become ineffective, that his not a failure of the line workers, that is a failure of line management and up. Which itself is due to a problem in the advancement and promotion process/policies.
 
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A robust safety regimen does not let the above, if it happens, result in a failure. You have layers of prevention and detection in place to prevent a root cause from escaping to a failure of high severity. When a cluster of incidents happens in a short time in one airline, that suggests the control plans designed to prevent these incidents have somehow become ineffective.

Edit: When control plans become ineffective, that his not a failure of the line workers, that is a failure of line management and up. Which itself is due to a problem in the advancement and promotion process/policies.
Yes, but that is insanely expensive. Most manufacturers will accept some "tolerance" (so to speak) in that area based on risk.
 
Yes, but that is insanely expensive. Most manufacturers will accept some "tolerance" (so to speak) in that area based on risk.
Agree. But that is built into the control plans as part of the FMEA (which I think might be a deliverable for air worthiness certification). Root cause failures that result in a passenger's infotainment system not working will have less costly control plan actions than root causes that result in the engine falling off the pylon in flight.
 
Innocent question... How do we know this was an aircraft issue and not an issue with the flight crew?
Innocent answer: We don’t. Technical problem can mean anything, and there is usually (not always, but usually) some factor with the end user that is of some interest.
 
I remember something kinda similar happened on a Quantas flight a while ago, but I believe it was A330. Where I think the autopilot had a little stroke and decided to rapidly descend very quickly.
 
Yes, but that is insanely expensive. Most manufacturers will accept some "tolerance" (so to speak) in that area based on risk.
I don't know if Boeing still uses the O&IR system of record keeping of manufacturing operations and inspections. That could be important to know, especially in this case.
 
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This just in. John Barnett, the Boeing whistle blower has been found dead. Initial report is that he died from a self inflected gun shot wound. Let the conspiracy theories begin. My thought is that it was a hit. He was set to testify and now he can't.
The rot runs deep, wide and old, such as "noncompliance in areas including Boeing’s manufacturing process control and its parts handling"

https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2024/03/12/boeing-whistleblower-dead-john-barnett/
 
This just in. John Barnett, the Boeing whistle blower has been found dead. Initial report is that he died from a self inflected gun shot wound. Let the conspiracy theories begin. My thought is that it was a hit. He was set to testify and now he can't.
While it's possible that Boeing took out a hit on him, it's also entirely possible that the stress of testifying (and of a major corporation with an incentive to ruin one's life) got to him. I'm not sure which I'd prefer to believe.
 
One of the things Barnett revealed is the deliberate omission of quality assurance inspections, as a cost-savings measure, from the jobs the factory mechanics perform. This system of Operations and Inspections Record (O&IR) has been the foundation of Boeing build quality since WW2.
 
May not be a sanctioned hit. Quality people make a lot of enemies.
That's what I do, maybe time for me to retire. Last week and this week I've put 20 hours into reviewing a big university building. I'm hoping a couple more hours in the morning and I'll finish.
 
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