Well put. On a related note, have any of NASA's operations ever generated revenue for them? From what I understand of their sounding rocket operations, those are conducted for organizations outside of NASA. I doubt they would do it for free... And haven't they been involved in the launching of commercial satelites?
Interesting Fred... I wasn't aware that anybody WAS suggesting the USAF run the civilian space program. The USAF has their hands full and does very well doing the milspace role which they have been doing. USAF has NO need of manned space flight, and as far as I know, no interest in it anymore. It's been WELL and THOROUGHLY PROVEN that unmanned satellite assets and systems are MORE than capable of performing the milspace missions they have been charged with performing than a similar manned system would be anyway, and doing it MUCH cheaper, simpler, and with better results, over longer periods of time. Even the Russians learned this lesson, as they actually flew their version of manned military space stations, in their Almaz (diamond) Program, whereas the US canceled first their Dyna-Soar military spaceplane and then the MOL manned military space station spysat which replaced it, both without having ever flown. Almaz worked, but it was found that adding the "manned" part to the equation just complicated everything and made it more expensive, difficult, and limited the time on orbit and the quality of the results. That's why they dropped them. The USAF has NO business in the manned spaceflight business, and you're right in that they would have little interest in the scientific mission and would divert funding to higher priority milspace or other military projects. Heck NASA has always put "science" in the distant back seat to "national prestige" when it comes to manned spaceflight anyway, so the military would doubtlessly be far worse!
@ Radman... whatever "income" NASA has gotten has been a meager paltry pittance compared to the gov't paid expenses involved to create the ability to receive those incomes... AFAIK, NASA has NEVER made a profit on anything it's done (nor is that its role). NASA was involved in satellite launches-- in fact, Shuttle was justified on that very grounds... that it would be "so cheap to operate" that NASA would become a moneymaking operation, which of course NEVER panned out. In fact, in the early days of shuttle development and operations, the laws were changed to favor, if not outright force all satellite launches possible onto the shuttle, and phase out expendable rockets. This was done to ensure that shuttle would have a sufficient "captive customer base" and lack of competition from expendable rockets to make it the 'sole provider' to the extent possible. Shuttle's manrating requirements, being a manned vehicle, its unusual cargo mounting requirements (from the sides rather than from the bottom like all previous space launch vehicles) and its numerous flight constraints, scrubs, and other difficulties conspired to make developing satellite payloads for shuttle launch MUCH more expensive than satellites launched by expendable LV's, and made their probabilities of timely launch without long, drawn-out delays before they were actually in space far lower than using simpler expendable vehicles. This had the effect of driving commercial satellite customers to other launch providers, such as Europe, and later on Russia, Japan, China, and India. In picking up the slack to take advantage of this new launch opportunity, ESA heavily subsidized thier launches and developed new launchers to service this need, and Russia started offering their existing and cost-competitive launchers to payloads from foriegn commercial enterprises, as did China and Japan... in effect, WE in the US subsidized the building of the competitive systems, especially the ESA Arianes and to a lesser extent the existing launch vehicles in Russia and China, to allow them to keep producing them, improve them, and make them cheaper, by subsidizing them with US launches that were forced overseas by commercial companies tired of the constraints and high costs and endless delays of shuttle launches, and having few US alternatives. IOW, we sold them the rope to hang us with... so to speak.
After the Challenger disaster exposed the inherent stupidity in using a complex and expensive MANNED vehicle to deliver unmanned satellite cargo to space, a job better and cheaper to perform with unmanned expendable vehicles, the main "reason" for shuttle evaporated as the gov't finally relented and finally quit trying to force everything onto shuttle, and instead brought the expendable LV's back from the brink of extinction in the US. The Air Force, which had, in its lingering lust for manned spaceflight on its own vehicles, a holdover from the 50's and 60's and its unrequited love of systems like Dyna-Soar and MOL, which never flew, (and thus the AF never learned the lessons FIRSTHAND that manned spaceflight is inferior to unmanned satellites for the milspace role, as the Soviets did on Almaz) had foolishly put all their eggs in one basket with shuttle, for the prospect of saving some money on development and getting approval to build a manned milspace vehicle (which wouldn't happen) and had "jumped in bed" with NASA (who themselves had agreed to "jump in bed" with the AF in order to get more funding for shuttle development, which was underfunded and of course was running into problems and cost overruns, being far more expensive than expected and taking longer to develop, leading to schedule slips). Hence the reason the shuttle evolved as it did, morphing from a totally-reusable booster rocketplane and stubby airplane like orbiter as proposed by Faget and others to the huge, delta-winged high-crossrange glider the Air Force demanded for their polar milspace "once-around" launches flying from Vandenberg over the South Pole and landing back at Edwards on the next pass. It was the backdoor way for the AF to FINALLY get the milspace manned program they had always wanted, and the backdoor way into more funding that NASA wanted for themselves. A perfect "marriage of convenience" (which rarely ends well, as this one proved not to as well). Challenger opened the Air Force's eyes to the inherent problems of relying on a single vehicle for the launch of virtually all the national defense assets, as well as the inherent drawbacks and limitations of manned spaceflight and manned vehicles in general, especially for the milspace mission. The Air Force had to scramble to pull Atlases and Deltas and Titans out of mothballs (so to speak) and carefully husband their use over the ensuing couple of years after Challenger to ensure their own access to space for the military launches that they needed to make for the national defense, and ramp up and revive the production of expendable launchers, as well as develop an alternative method of launching the massive spysats they had envisioned being launched on the proven unreliable shuttle, should it be unavailable. Hence the Titan IV program. It soon became apparent that expendable launch WAS more cost-competitive to expensive shuttle launches, due to allowing simpler, more efficient design of the spacecraft being launched (not having to endure the requirements of being "man-rated" for launch aboard shuttle, not having to account for it's strange payload integration and mating requirements on launch in the shuttle payload bay, making the satellites cheaper to design and build). Sadly, Titan IV was NOT the expendable vehicle they wanted or hoped for-- it was roughly as expensive as launch aboard a shuttle, in no small part to the additional costs of the large segmented SRB's. SO, the AF went looking for a better solution, especially since the supply of Titan cores wasn't going to last forever. Hence, the EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) Program to develop Delta IV and Atlas V. EELV, using the common core principle of using three first stages firing in tandem with the outer two functioning as liquid rocket boosters on heavy launches, did away with the expensive necessity of maintaining a separate large segmented solid rocket booster program, as well as the supporting infrastructure and personnell to support them. This was going to save a lot of costs in and of itself. The other idea which has a lot of merit is the "dial a rocket" idea, of using small monolithic solid strap-on boosters in varying numbers as needed, tailoring the vehicle for the weight and needs of the specific payload. EELV hasn't turned out to be the panacea it was promised to be, as it is more expensive than planned, in large part due to the vigorous foriegn competition for commercial launches from ESA, Russia, and China, coupled with a downturn in the world launch market due to the tech-bubble implosion of the 90's and the drying up of the massive launch requirements to support large constellations of satellite telephone relay sats from various providers. The ideas behind EELV's is sound, though...
So, now NASA is FINALLY starting to catch up to the lessons the Air Force learned in the late 80's and early 90's. Commercial is the way to go and holds a lot of promise. It will have its share of setbacks along the way, surely, and will probably not be the panacea that some folks make it out to be, but it's a good way forward and holds a lot of promise. Problem is, NASA is a political animal, unlike the milspace program which can operate in a far better funded position as a "national defense priority" and operate behind a curtain of privacy to an extent due to the "sensitive nature" of its intelligence gathering role and supporting military operations. NASA must operate in the glaring spotlight of public debate and policy, and enjoys none of the 'anonymity' that milspace operates behind. NASA also has it's own inbred supporting structure in the political bureaucracy which uses it for their own best political benefit, whether it makes particularly good technical or mission sense or not. Usually the political effects of a decision are of far more importance than the technical or scientific ramifications. This of course leads to some of the silliness and seemingly counterintuitive decisions coming out of NASA, which, if you dig deep enough, are politically motivated and have NOTHING to do with the best way to actually perform the assigned mission... most things are calculated to reward specific areas in the "space states" (and thus help ensure reelection of specific lawmakers) or to reward specific selected space contractors, usually those who are the most active in lobbying or the best political benefactors to said lawmakers. Commercial has an uphill battle to wage against the entrenched "system" as it exists within and without of NASA... It really is a "political/industrial complex" like what Eisenhower warned against in 1960 (or January 61 anyway). Hopefully they'll succeed... IF you look at the way Congress is funding commercial crew (at a pittance and wanting to cut that every chance they get, and wanting to "muck up the process" every way they can, like their recent attempt to force a "downselect" to a single provider when the actual competition hasn't even gotten underway in a meaningful way yet) it becomes apparent that their intention is to maintain the "status quo" of the system as it now exists. That's why Congress is perfectly content to allow NASA to fiddle with building a huge shuttle-derived HLV rocket that won't even be ready for testing for another 5-7 years, and won't be flying "operationally" for another ten years from now, while US astronauts are "hitching rides" on Russian Soyuz's at $72 million a pop... it also shows why they're not worried that there are NO landers, NO habs, NO supplementary systems (like rovers, etc.) approved for development programs now, which will be ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY to perform ANY "exploration missions" the SLS and Orion are supposedly being developed for in the future. I'm aware that not everything can afford to be developed at once (hence the brilliance of the "spiral development" program that O'Keefe and Steidle proposed) but at the same time, a rocket without payloads is pretty useless. It will take the better part of ten years to develop a lander or hab after it IS approved as a funded program, meanwhile SLS will just be sitting around gathering dust, while the overhead and infrastructure expenses and workforce necessary to build and operate it will have to be maintained with little or no actual missions of any consequence possible, meaning it will be EXTREMELY expensive to maintain (remember it cost around $2 billion a year to keep the shuttle program alive during its stand-downs after Challenger and Columbia, even with NO shuttles flying-- so it will be with SLS, and probably more so.) This will make SLS a prime target for cancellation, as it has every other expensive space project in the past with too little benefit for the costs involved.
Even assuming a best-case scenario, and everything goes swimmingly as planned... SLS/Orion will ONLY be flying missions about every 24-36 months... the halcyon days of flying missions every 6 months like on Apollo, or every couple of months or so on shuttle (depending on what part of the shuttle era you look at) are gone and forgotten. Our "exploration" program, even if it works *as advertised* will MUCH more closely resemble the current Chinese space program with its 2-3 year gap between missions than it will resemble the good old days of Apollo. This will make it VERY expensive indeed, as the infrastructure and overhead costs to maintain everything for those infrequent missions every couple years will have to be borne alone by each one... as well as lowering the flightrates and making production of the vehicles highly expensive and inefficient (unless you do like Apollo did, and commit to simply ordering ONE batch of "sufficient size" for the program missions you have planned, and then either have to face the expenses and difficulties of 'reviving' the capability to build more at some point, or retire the entire system and go with something new, as Saturn was retired and replaced by shuttle... (a second production run of Saturn V's was contemplated but never occurred.)
Things are usually a lot more complicated than they appear on the surface. When you really get into it, you start to see all the little nuances that go into making things work the way they do, whether with the intricacies of the vehicles themselves and the interactions and tradeoffs involved or in the more 'vulgar' machinations of the management and political decision-making process governing the space program and NASA itself...
Later! OL JR