Could the Crew of Columbia Have Been Rescued?

[BABAR]

Yes, they were informed but trusted NASA's conclusions that the foam was little threat.

An EVA was not possible because the airlock hatch at the back of the mid-deck that is used for EVA's was connected to the spacelab in the payload bay. The only exit was through the main hatch on the side, which would have required depressurizing the entire cabin to use.

Not enough ready-to-go Soyuz craft would have been available and even if they were, Columbia was in an orbit that couldn't be reached by a Soyuz from Baikonur.

Good point that spaceflight is risky, it is placing humans in the most hostile environment he has ever faced.

Netflix currently has a documentary

Challenger: The Final Flight.

It is written obviously is hindsight, and certainly may be biased.

One interesting thing it mentioned is one of the experienced astronauts suggesting that taking a teacher, or any nonprofessional astronaut (previous to this most if not all astronauts were either military or specifically civilian trained to BE astronauts) may have been inappropriate, sort of saying, “Space Travel is now so safe we can casually take an grade school teacher along for the ride.”

In medicine (at least in U,S,) we have added a “time out” mini “pre-procedure” briefing, in the operating room or invasive imaging procedure room, where a designated person gets everyone’s attention and we check the patient ID, the order, the SIDE of the procedure, to make sure we have the right patient and the right procedure and the correct side. The idea was (and still is) to avoid those supposedly one in a million cases (actually probably far. Ore frequent) where one or more of the above was incorrect, sometimes with minimal fallout and sometimes catastrophic. Problem is, it wasn’t long before the “time out” became so routine that you really had to work to get people to pay attention to it, since it was so relatively rare that we DIDN’T have everything right. I was having to remind people that we did this for a REASON ( meconium happens!), otherwise it turned into just “going through the motions.”

Routine, and especially SUCCESSFUL routine breeds complacency.

Something to remember next time you hook up your rocket chute or load your booster engine (zero delay?) , or whatever you guys and gals with electronic deployment do. Even checklists and supervision are only as good as the user and supervisor.

 

[JoePfeiffer]

I normally don't get involved in the "what if..." threads, but the problems go back even further; to the very beginning. Originally, the Shuttle was to be the "DC-3" of space travel", but thanks to the late George Shultz as director of Office of Management and Budget, put the kibosh to the original idea which was that the Shuttle would be launched on a reusable ship. Shultz raised heck about the cost and extra research needed to develop that reusable ship. THAT'S why the shuttle ended up as it did. Blame Shultz for the deaths of both crews, IMHO

Remember, the whole point of the Shuttle was it was supposed to be a cheaper way to get stuff in orbit. The fully-reusable concept would have been vastly more complicated, more expensive, had a much smaller payload (the size of the payload bay was to support the Air Force's estimates of future satellites, and their support was essential to get it funded), and wouldn't have been any more survivable in a launch failure.

Incidentally, Shultz is still alive.

 

[Antares JS]

The fully-reusable concept would have been vastly more complicated, more expensive, (...)

More complicated and expensive to develop and build, yes, but likely cheaper to operate.

 

[KilroySmith]

NASA management decided that none of these were needed, they incorrectly believed that the re-entry was safe.
...
The crew would NOT preform a high risk EVA without NASA's approval. This is not hollywood, this is real life. The crew believed, with the information at hand that a safe re-entry would be the outcome.

I mostly agree with what you wrote, except those two statements.
NASA management believed that:
1. The re-entry would be fine because foam strikes hadn't killed anyone before, so this time the foam strike also likely didn't do any severe damage (an example of the "normalization of deviance" behavior). This is likely the main reason that they agreed with the "No problem" side of the engineering team.
2. Even if #1 were wrong and damage had occurred, there was nothing that would save the astronauts, so there were strong reasons to not even look to see if there were a problem (NASA countermanding requests for spy satellite imagery).

The crew wouldn't perform a high risk EVA in a well-ordered mission (or a well-ordered failure), because they wouldn't be given the information that would lead to that action. The crew of a spaceship may believe that they're in control, but they're only in control to the extent that they're allowed to KNOW what's happening.

 

[Ez2cDave]

The crew wouldn't perform a high risk EVA in a well-ordered mission (or a well-ordered failure), because they wouldn't be given the information that would lead to that action. The crew of a spaceship may believe that they're in control, but they're only in control to the extent that they're allowed to KNOW what's happening.

Like I said, the Crew were, obviously, not told the ENTIRE truth . . .

If I were the Shuttle Commander, and we were informed that ANYTHING hit us on the way up, WE ARE GOING EVA, even if it is "High-Risk" . . . If NASA didn't like that, we would let the "Court of Public Opinion" decide, presuming that we either survive re-entry or we are "rescued" and return, safely, to Earth !

Dave F.

 

[user 13]

I mostly agree with what you wrote, except those two statements.
NASA management believed that:
1. The re-entry would be fine because foam strikes hadn't killed anyone before, so this time the foam strike also likely didn't do any severe damage (an example of the "normalization of deviance" behavior). This is likely the main reason that they agreed with the "No problem" side of the engineering team.
2. Even if #1 were wrong and damage had occurred, there was nothing that would save the astronauts, so there were strong reasons to not even look to see if there were a problem (NASA countermanding requests for spy satellite imagery).

The crew wouldn't perform a high risk EVA in a well-ordered mission (or a well-ordered failure), because they wouldn't be given the information that would lead to that action. The crew of a spaceship may believe that they're in control, but they're only in control to the extent that they're allowed to KNOW what's happening.

I think we are saying the same thing. You just said it better!

 

[KilroySmith]

I'm hoping that SpaceX addresses issue #2 directly, both with their Mars astronauts and the public. They'll be flying a ship with a massive quantity of supplies, sufficient to keep the occupants alive for months, perhaps as much as a year. Should something occur on the outbound leg that prevents them from slowing down sufficiently to be able to aerobrake in the Mars atmosphere, we may have a year of soon-to-be-dead astronauts hurtling towards Jupiter and beyond. I'd like that to be part of the pre-launch preparations - "There are scenarios where we end up having to give a long good-bye to our astronauts; here are some of the options we've discussed". It would certainly make the decision making a lot easier at that point...

 

[Ez2cDave]

I'm hoping that SpaceX addresses issue #2 directly, both with their Mars astronauts and the public. They'll be flying a ship with a massive quantity of supplies, sufficient to keep the occupants alive for months, perhaps as much as a year. Should something occur on the outbound leg that prevents them from slowing down sufficiently to be able to aerobrake in the Mars atmosphere, we may have a year of soon-to-be-dead astronauts hurtling towards Jupiter and beyond. I'd like that to be part of the pre-launch preparations - "There are scenarios where we end up having to give a long good-bye to our astronauts; here are some of the options we've discussed". It would certainly make the decision making a lot easier at that point...

Turn up the heat, administer a heavy dose of sedatives, combined with slowly venting the capsule to the vacuum of space . . . Peaceful sleep ( forever ).

Dave F.

 

[prfesser]

Hindsight is 2020.

NASA management was informed of the impact on the wing by the foam.
The crew was informed.
Some engineers were concerned about the damage to the wing, some were not. Management decided to back the
ones who who said everything was good, the wrong choice.

A rescue mission would have been incredibly risky, Not so much dangerous but risky.

The crew did not have the proper EVA suits or the Canadarm with the camera to do a low risk inspection of the area. A procedure for a relatively high risk EVA was available, as was the possibility of imaging the wing with with clandestine assets.

NASA management decided that none of these were needed, they incorrectly believed that the re-entry was safe.

Risk management was what NASA's leaders job was/is, they failed that day.

The crew would NOT preform a high risk EVA without NASA's approval. This is not hollywood, this is real life. The crew believed, with the information at hand that a safe re-entry would be the outcome.

The end result was the loss of the crew and the shuttle, a huge tragedy that we all wish never happened.

Human spaceflight is incredibly unforgiving. NASA management made the wrong decision. They paid with their careers, the crew paid with their lives.

This. And this is why I think the original article posted by OP is more clickbait than it is factual.

"Hindsight is 20/20" EXACTLY. Consider what would have happened if Columbia had actually made it back to the surface with the entire crew okay. We'd see a bunch of clickbaits about "What could have happened with Columbia" "Did we miss losing (insert number) astronauts by a razor-thin margin?" "Was the return of Columbia a miracle?"

Such articles would not have been presented for their veracity. They would have been posted largely because clickbait works.

And consider, as well, what we'd have seen if a rescue had been launched and failed. "NASA loses seven more astronauts in a ludicrous attempt at rescue!" "Why did NASA kill seven more people than was necessary?" etc.

Hindsight is not just 20/20. It's a great way to make money.

Sardonically and pessimisticaly yours -- Terry