Rogue Boeing 737 Max planes ‘with minds of their own’ | 60 Minutes Australia

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This just earned the #3 spot on my Do Not Ride list.
#1. Boeing 737 Max
#2. Space X Dragon capsule

EDIT: Forgot about this:
#4. Boeing CST-100 space capsule
Can't speak to 2,3 and 4 but the 737 Max is a great airplane super safe to fly. Problems were real but not real bad. The crashes were partially a result of pilot error as the problem was easily overcome with proper execution of emergency procedures. Not sure why they weren't taught about basically runaway trim. I think the biggest problem with the Max was people finding out how the Gov does oversight in certifying commercial aircraft.
 
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The crashes were partially a result of pilot error as the problem was easily overcome with proper execution of emergency procedures.

Oh B's! Yeah, it's always pilot error.

Pilot's first error was getting in the plane.

Second error was thinking it was the same as a real 737, trusting engineers, marketing, and FAA oversight.

Third error was not taking the training that wasn't provided for the broken subsystem that they didn't know about and weren't told about

Yeah, pilot error, get off that.
 
Oh B's! Yeah, it's always pilot error.
It almost always is.
Yeah, pilot error, get off that.
+1.
The MCAS overrode the pilots' inputs causing the plane to nose down.
The pilots in both crashes were highly experienced.
They were not warned that the MCAS system could override their inputs nor were they trained in the proper protocols to take if that occurred.
So no, definitely not pilot error.
Manufacturer error, definitely.
Some would say manufacturer malfeasance.
https://www.theguardian.com/busines...x-crashes-american-airlines-pilots-union-mcas'“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane,” a pilot said.'
 
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The MCAS overrode the pilots' inputs causing the plane to nose down.
The pilots in both crashes were highly experienced.
They were not warned that the MCAS system could override their inputs nor were they trained in the proper protocols to take if that occurred.
So no, definitely not pilot error.
Manufacturer error, definitely.
Some would say manufacturer malfeasance.
https://www.theguardian.com/busines...x-crashes-american-airlines-pilots-union-mcas'“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane,” a pilot said.'
I'm not sure what you consider "experienced" but the in the Ethiopian crash, the pilot in command had 103 hours in the Max and the co-pilot had 56 hours in the Max. The co-pilot had fewer than 400hrs total time in airplanes...ever. They failed to follow the check list on departure and set the appropriate power settings and when the MCAS system pushed the nose down, the autopilot was disengaged and the plane was flyable...they chose to re-engage the autopilot as second time and the plane crashed.

There is no doubt the aircraft had a design flaw. There is no doubt the international pilot standards are less then the US standards. There is no doubt the pilots were not trained properly. There is no doubt the many times the MCAS failed to operate properly on US based aircraft that none crashed.

Good luck with your fear of flying in the Max. It's now a perfectly safe aircraft.
 
I'm not sure what you consider "experienced" but the in the Ethiopian crash, the pilot in command had 103 hours in the Max and the co-pilot had 56 hours in the Max.
The 737 Max was a new plane. Think that may have something to do with it? The Ethiopian pilot had over 8000 hours of flight experience and the Lion Air pilot over 6000, mostly on 737s. Like I said, highly experienced.
when the MCAS system pushed the nose down, the autopilot was disengaged and the plane was flyable...they chose to re-engage the autopilot as second time and the plane crashed.
When the MCAS pushed the nose down the pilots reacted as they were trained to do. When they pulled the yoke up the MCAS pitched the nose even further down. If they had known the nose down was being caused by the MCAS they could have turned it off. They didn't even know the system was on the plane.
There is no doubt the many times the MCAS failed to operate properly on US based aircraft that none crashed.
Define "many". Again, it was a new plane. That there were no US crashes is only by the grace of God.
Per Dennis Tajer of the Airline pilots union:
"Tajer said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots did what they were instructed to do, but that Boeing’s controversial anti-stall software (MCAS) forced the plane into such an aggressive nosedive that the pilots could not recover. “They had wired that thing so that it was irrecoverable. It just blew us away,” Tajer said."
The crashes were partially a result of pilot error as the problem was easily overcome with proper execution of emergency procedures.
Demonstrably false. How can a pilot execute an emergency procedure on a system he was never informed about? Laying the blame on pilot error is, as the pilots union said, "inexcusable".
Good luck with your fear of flying in the Max. It's now a perfectly safe aircraft.
Operative word now. After years of review and redesign. And the needless loss of 346 innocent people.
As far as "perfectly safe" time will tell. Moreso than your assessment.
 
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The 737 Max was a new plane. Think that may have something to do with it? The Ethiopian pilot had over 8000 hours of flight experience and the Lion Air pilot over 6000, mostly on 737s. Like I said, highly experienced.

When the MCAS pushed the nose down the pilots reacted as they were trained to do. When they pulled the yoke up the MCAS pitched the nose even further down. If they had known the nose down was being caused by the MCAS they could have turned it off. They didn't even know the system was on the plane.

Define "many". Again, it was a new plane. That there were no US crashes is only by the grace of God.
Per Dennis Tajer of the Airline pilots union:
"Tajer said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots did what they were instructed to do, but that Boeing’s controversial anti-stall software (MCAS) forced the plane into such an aggressive nosedive that the pilots could not recover. “They had wired that thing so that it was irrecoverable. It just blew us away,” Tajer said."

Demonstrably false. How can a pilot execute an emergency procedure on a system he was never informed about? Laying the blame on pilot error is, as the pilots union said, "inexcusable".

That remains to be seen. Go tell that to the 346 people who needlessly lost their lives.
"Demonstrably" That's a big word.

The Ethiopian Air pilot (corrected) had ~1400 737 hours...less than the total hours required to be hired by a US airline (in any aircraft).

There were approx 375 Maxs flying world-wide when the crashes occurred. Flying a total of approx 275,000 to 300,000 hours (500,000 flights). In the US, the inventory was about 100 jets flying approx 100,000 hrs in that timeframe.
 
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I'm not sure what you consider "experienced" but the in the Ethiopian crash, the pilot in command had 103 hours in the Max and the co-pilot had 56 hours in the Max. The co-pilot had fewer than 400hrs total time in airplanes...ever. They failed to follow the check list on departure and set the appropriate power settings and when the MCAS system pushed the nose down, the autopilot was disengaged and the plane was flyable...they chose to re-engage the autopilot as second time and the plane crashed.

There is no doubt the aircraft had a design flaw. There is no doubt the international pilot standards are less then the US standards. There is no doubt the pilots were not trained properly. There is no doubt the many times the MCAS failed to operate properly on US based aircraft that none crashed.

Good luck with your fear of flying in the Max. It's now a perfectly safe aircraft.
You cherry pick very well. The Lion Air flight crew had thousands of hours in 737s and had done their flight training in California. Also, how was the Ethiopian Air pilot supposed to have more hours in a new plane that Boeing said was just like the old one?

Not to mention that a group of Western pilots ran simulators off the Ethiopian flight. None of them could recover the flight without losing more than 8K feet of altitude. The Ethiopian flight never got above 8K feet so they would all have crashed too, even though they knew what the failure mechanism was. They only recovered with that altitude loss by using flight maneuvers that were no longer part of standard training. And why did the Ethiopian pilots turn the autopilot back on? Because there was too much force on the manual handwheel and they couldn’t turn it.

I think the Max is a safe plane… now. Back then? Not so much.
 
Oh B's! Yeah, it's always pilot error.

Pilot's first error was getting in the plane.

Second error was thinking it was the same as a real 737, trusting engineers, marketing, and FAA oversight.

Third error was not taking the training that wasn't provided for the broken subsystem that they didn't know about and weren't told about

Yeah, pilot error, get off that.

But, you see, the proof it was pilot error, was the fact that neither the FAA, nor any other countries grounded the Max. And did not demand fixes (and special training) before restoring their flight certificates. Because it was pilot error, nothing to do with the plane.

OH.

THEY DID GROUND IT.



Boeing Effed up big-time. It was NOT pilot error. It was Boeing engineering error.

And, they admitted it. Boeing did not blame dead corpses for the crashes.

"Boeing admits full responsibility for 737 Max plane crash in Ethiopia"​


https://www.theguardian.com/busines...ity-737-max-plane-crash-ethiopia-compensation
 
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The Lion Air pilot had ~1400 737 hours...less than the total hours required to be hired by a US airline (in any aircraft).
Multiple sources I have read say that the Lion Air pilot had over 5000 hours experience on the 737, and over 6000 hours total. Would you like to share the source of your 1400 figure?
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/on-...captain-had-the-flu-copilot-was-a-sub-2123996"The captain was a 31-year-old man from India who had more than 6,000 hours of experience, including 5,176 hours on the 737. The first officer was a 41-year-old Indonesian who had been with Lion Air since 2011."
 
Multiple sources I have read say that the Lion Air pilot had over 5000 hours experience on the 737, and over 6000 hours total. Would you like to share the source of your 1400 figure?
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/on-...captain-had-the-flu-copilot-was-a-sub-2123996"The captain was a 31-year-old man from India who had more than 6,000 hours of experience, including 5,176 hours on the 737. The first officer was a 41-year-old Indonesian who had been with Lion Air since 2011."
Ethiopian Air Pilot (corrected)... ~1400 in the 737. ~150 between the two pilots...
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/boeing-737-max-8-crashes-case-pilot-error-vaughn-cordle-cfa/
 
But, you see, the proof it was pilot error, was the fact that neither the FAA, nor any other countries grounded the Max. And did not demand fixes (and special training) before restoring their flight certificates. Because it was pilot error, nothing to do with the plane.

OH.

THEY DID GROUND IT.



Boeing Effed up big-time. It was NOT pilot error. It was Boeing engineering error.

And, they admitted it. Boeing did not blame dead corpses for the crashes.

"Boeing admits full responsibility for 737 Max plane crash in Ethiopia"​


https://www.theguardian.com/busines...ity-737-max-plane-crash-ethiopia-compensation
That's very emotional. "Because it was pilot error, nothing to do with the plane."... There were problems with the system, no one is denying that. Boeing grounded the planes, rewrote the software and restored the planes to flight. Pilot ability played a role. Like it or not.
 
And yet not even Boeing itself is pushing the argument that the pilots -ought- to have known how to disable the system. That they didn't know existed. So no, there's no 'like it or not' to this. You're just pushing a theory with no rational basis.
 
And yet not even Boeing itself is pushing the argument that the pilots -ought- to have known how to disable the system. That they didn't know existed. So no, there's no 'like it or not' to this. You're just pushing a theory with no rational basis.
So here is some analysis done by experts that used rational data from the actual Flight Data Recorder (FDR) from Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. One interesting fact is MCAS can not be activated until the flaps are raised. One of the down sides of this analysis is it is done on the ground at "groundspeed 0" after the fact. It doesn't change what happened in the airplane. 1655414769705.png
 
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And yet not even Boeing itself is pushing the argument that the pilots -ought- to have known how to disable the system. That they didn't know existed. So no, there's no 'like it or not' to this. You're just pushing a theory with no rational basis.


Boeing stuffed up big time, but there is a pilot component to the crashes. My brother inlaw is an aircraft engineer for an international carrier. His job was to train pilots on the engineering side of the aircraft. Surprisingly to me his opinion was that the pilot was a part of the problem. They all train for runaway elevators, even before MCAS. There is a manual wheel in the cockpit that spins when the elevator moves and will make considerable noise (hard to ignore) when there is a runaway elevator. The established procedures would have prevented the crash had they been applied according to him. I think it was stop the handle turning and then throw the relevant circuit breaker IIRC.

Of course add confusion on the flight deck, engineering design that was flawed (too much control authority is only one aspect of that) and not tested, and a defective sensor, then the probability function is greatly shifted in the fail direction. Their engineering design was wrong, as was their human engineering design for that system. A very sad situation for anyone who had loved ones on those aircraft, whatever the cause.
 
I believe Boeing made a very bad compromise to try to sell planes and there appears to have been some very dirty dealings with certain entities inside and outside of Boeing. I would say I'm 99.99% sure if anybody in the decision making chain could have known about the crashes and the fallout, they wouldn't have proceeded as they did. Hopefully the crashes alone would have made them change their decision making process. . .

I imagine if the system had been treated like any other new aircraft system, it would have had redundant sensors or very clear training for possible errors. Regretfully, the desire to sell planes to one or more companies without additional simulator time is apparently the root cause, if you believe the information that has been presented over the past few years. Regretfully, I believe that information is likely very accurate.

I would not be concerned at all to fly on a Max today, as I believe it has been very scrutinized and is a solid system now. I believe pilot input and outside variables contributed to the specific crashes, but I also wish there had been training to give them the right reaction and checklists to get out of the situation as quickly as possible. That was not the case and for an industry like aerospace, that is unacceptable in my opinion.

Sandy.
 
https://www.reuters.com/business/ae...ing-timetable-737-max-10-approval-2022-06-15/
Timeline for 737 Max Approval Unclear
Reuters (6/15) reports The Boeing Company “on Wednesday said it was making progress with regulators on its 737 MAX 10 aircraft but declined to offer a clear timeline on when it expects to win approval, in a tougher regulatory climate.” Boeing Commercial Airplanes Senior Vice President Mike Fleming said, “We really need to complete a good proportion of the development assurance work. It’s taking longer to get approval of our documents than it has in the past.” Both the Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing “are working through a process that is different from what Boeing has done in the past, making it a challenge.” If Boeing misses the December deadline for the 737 MAX 10’s approval, the FAA could require Boeing “to revamp the jet’s crew alerting system and institute separate pilot training, which would raise costs to airlines and put orders at risk.”

The Wall Street Journal (6/15, Subscription Publication) reports Boeing has named company attorney Mark Fava as its ombudsperson for employees working on behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration.
 
Ohh dear...

This again.

As someone who flys the plane, has flown the MCAS failures, and has read ALL of BOTH accident.

Bravo 52 is correct.

Believe what you want, fly on what you want, but the bottom line is both accident aircrews screwed the pooch
badly.

I'm not going to repost what I've already posted.

Bottom line, BOTH aircrews NEVER performed the approved Boeing procedure for runaway trim. MCAS failure manifests itself as runaway trim. EVERY 737 pilot has to memorize the procedure and demonstrate it in the sim.
MCAS is a subsystem of Speed Trim, a system that has been on the aircraft since the early '80s.
Runaway trim is how MCAS failed, THERE IS A PROCEDURE FOR THIS!

Don't tell me that some report said they did, IT'S IN THE ACCIDENT REPORT THAT THEY DIDN'T. One crew started it and then reversed course the other didn't.

Other warnings were present, THAT HAPPENS A LOT. A professional pilot needs to prioritize what will kill you NOW and deal with it.

Neither crew followed the 1st rule of aviation. FLY THE DAMN BEAST!

Boatgeek, Not true. The failure is a handfull but is totally flyable. How do I know? I'VE DONE IT! I did it at 100 ft on takeoff and lost less than 50 ft.

Don't fly on it, I don't care. I strap my ass into the machine regularly at work. I put my loved ones on it without reservation.

Believe what you want. Believe what you cherry pick from various sources that you read in 15 min. Or believe
pilots who actually know what happened and how.

The pilot of Ethiopian air had 6000 hours, that is nothing in aviation, that would get you hired by a US airline as a first officer. As an example I have over 28,000 hours.
 
Ohh dear...

This again.
Exactly my reaction. Why revive this thread at all? And why bring in that quote from Gary (@kuririn) which I can’t find posted in this thread at all except to argue with it.

As someone who was there, in Renton, as the Max was being developed, my thoughts about the technical and management of what went wrong are already in this thread.

I look forward to the chance to get on a Max now, and very much appreciate @mach7 weighing in, as one who sits in the left seat in a Max for his day job.
 
Why revive this thread at all?

I think it is because of new forum 'features' that put suggested posts at the bottom. There is apparently no tuning for those posts that say whether they are active or recent, as indicated by the screenshot attached as to what is suggested by this thread to me.

I've accidentally posted in a few that were from the 2010's and slightly more recent before realizing I'm resurrecting a post from way back. I've tried to watch dates since I realized the issue, but all it take is for someone else to reply and the date is now current, even though the original post is far gone. That's what happened here for me at least. . .

I'm not a fan of the new forum software in certain places and this is one of them. In the attached pic, similar posts are from 2006, 2014 and 2016. . . but if I thought there was a war going on, I might reply to seeing an F-117A begin shot down or if I were building an L3, I might reply to the 98mm minimum diameter build. . .

Sandy.

1655442284334.png
[edit: right after posting. . .]

Or what OverTheTop said. . . I've seen a lot of thread zombies recently, but in this case, it might have been something else.

[/edit]
 
OK, here's what happened:
I had posted over two years ago in the SpaceX's Starship thread that there were 4 vehicles I wouldn't get on: https://www.rocketryforum.com/threads/spacexs-starship.157894/page-3
Starship had just suffered a "rapid deconstruction", as had the Dragon capsule. Boeing's Starliner capsule had failed to reach orbit due to a software timer issue. And of course, the brand new 737 Max had suffered two recent crashes. Then someone replied the other day to the two year old post saying why the 737 Max. So I responded.
A mod decided the discussion was going off topic so he moved it here.
And thank you Mach 7 for your expert evaluation.
Perhaps you can clear up something that's confusing me. The head of the AA pilots union, a veteran 737 pilot who also flew the Max said the Ethiopian pilot did everything he was trained to do. The MCAS pitched the nose down so aggressively that it was unrecoverable. So what went wrong? Is the recovery procedure on Speed Trim the same as on MCAS? If not were the two flight crews trained on the MCAS procedure? Did they even know it was part of the plane? In your opinion would the crashes be mainly attributable to defective hardware/software design or pilot error, or a combination of the two?
And any new MicroMaxx builds? 😁
 
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Ohh dear...

This again.

As someone who flys the plane, has flown the MCAS failures, and has read ALL of BOTH accident.

Bravo 52 is correct.

Believe what you want, fly on what you want, but the bottom line is both accident aircrews screwed the pooch
badly.

I'm not going to repost what I've already posted.

Bottom line, BOTH aircrews NEVER performed the approved Boeing procedure for runaway trim. MCAS failure manifests itself as runaway trim. EVERY 737 pilot has to memorize the procedure and demonstrate it in the sim.
MCAS is a subsystem of Speed Trim, a system that has been on the aircraft since the early '80s.
Runaway trim is how MCAS failed, THERE IS A PROCEDURE FOR THIS!

Don't tell me that some report said they did, IT'S IN THE ACCIDENT REPORT THAT THEY DIDN'T. One crew started it and then reversed course the other didn't.
Well said Mach! Full disclosure, Mach and I worked at the same company for many years as pilots and I agree with what he says. I will also add a tidbit that has been largely ignored in the whole process. This tidbit cuts the core of why Boeing tried to minimize training for MCAS and didn't even include it in the initial flight handbook for the Max. Boeing was doing what their major customer wanted. Bad decision, but money talks when MBA's are running the show.

Southwest Airlines negotiated a one million dollar contractual penalty against Boeing for EVERY Max they had on order if additional pilot simulator training was required to transition to the MAX. According to this article from 2021 SWA had 234 of the aircraft on order. https://simpleflying.com/southwest-airlines-737-max-7-order/

Pilot error might have been the last critical error in the daisy chain of this accident, but corporate greed was the first.
 
Well said Mach! Full disclosure, Mach and I worked at the same company for many years as pilots and I agree with what he says. I will also add a tidbit that has been largely ignored in the whole process. This tidbit cuts the core of why Boeing tried to minimize training for MCAS and didn't even include it in the initial flight handbook for the Max. Boeing was doing what their major customer wanted. Bad decision, but money talks when MBA's are running the show.

Southwest Airlines negotiated a one million dollar contractual penalty against Boeing for EVERY Max they had on order if additional pilot simulator training was required to transition to the MAX. According to this article from 2021 SWA had 234 of the aircraft on order. https://simpleflying.com/southwest-airlines-737-max-7-order/

Pilot error might have been the last critical error in the daisy chain of this accident, but corporate greed was the first.
^ That.

What was also a significant problem was the way in which the FAA certified commercial aircraft. This is similar (not the same but like) to the model used by defense contractors that "allow" them to "certify" their own aircraft. Basically, the FAA didn't have the resources to oversee, review and flight test aircraft so they relied on the manufacturer to provide the information necessary to certify the model. Would that have caught the error in the MCAS system design? No (very unlikely). However, as OTT shows above, it process has a lot more scrutiny now than before and is taking longer.

I've done vulnerability assessments on most of the B737s before the Max (not including) and one of the things we learned was the cockpits are almost identical on all NG aircraft to include ones like the RAAF jets. That is on purpose. Even legacy 737s are so similar, you could consider them the same through each model -3/4/5. At one time, even did FCFs on -200 but they are very different. That goes to the heart of pterodactyl's comment above.

So yeah, I responded to the Starship post because it showed up in my daily threads and thought it was lacking and in need of some comment. Of course that brought out a lot of opinions and feelings. 😆
 
So yeah, I responded to the Starship post because it showed up in my daily threads and thought it was lacking and in need of some comment. Of course that brought out a lot of opinions and feelings. 😆
Yeah, I'm sure everyone here appreciates you necroing my 2+year old post and stirring the pot all over again.
Especially the moderators.
 

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