New documentary about Pearl Harbor attack

The Rocketry Forum

Help Support The Rocketry Forum:

This site may earn a commission from merchant affiliate links, including eBay, Amazon, and others.
Where are you going with all this?
Well, I'm going to necessarily limit my investigations from this point on to these items:

1. What was the source of those correct Hawaiian newspaper headlines and is there any other confirming evidence behind Joseph Leib's claim, supposedly solving what was still a mystery in 1984 for something so incredible that IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED long ago.
2. What is the validity of the 1949 Chinese Nationalist claim that they passed a warning to London which they, perhaps incorrectly, assumed was passed to DC?
3. What was that "It's going to happen tonight" comment by the US gunboat officer in China based upon?
4. What was the scuttlebut at Pearl, in Hawaii, and with US personnel in China just prior to the attack?

ALL of that is going to take a LOT of work and NOT on-line. It means reading or at least scanning every book I can get through inter-library loan if necessary on the subject of the Pearl attack since the possible answers won't necessarily be limited to books about foreknowledge, getting copies of period newspaper articles, etc., etc. This is probably going to take a LONG time since it definitely won't be a sole effort of mine.

A summary from what I've learned so far just on-line in a few days:

1. There was a goal to incite the Japanese to surprise attack; Nimitz knew or suspected this and took a pre-war desk job to avoid the inevitable scapegoating, only going to sea after the attack.
2. Richardson, one of the very best US Admirals based upon his prescient warnings who was an expert on Japanese military tactics warned, along with others in the Navy, that stationing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl would make it a sitting duck to the surprise attack he knew would be characteristic of the Japanese and was a bad idea for many other reasons. He was forced to resign.
3. When there was a warning that an attack was imminent, unbelievable levels of inaction and improper action at the very highest levels were evident, FAR beyond simple incompetence; my best guess is that they didn't want to possibly deter an attack by showing signs of being ready for it since there were known or suspected to be Japanese spies near every Pacific installation who would notice any alert; thus, since the goal in the first place was to incite a surprise attack from the Japanese, just let it happen wherever it was going to happen, but send a too-late alert to cover your a**.

About the Hawaiian newspaper headlines:

1. They were made exactly at the time when Japanese intercepts indicated they were definitely planning to go to war in the very near future.
2. Since it's likely only a small fraction of Pearl personnel would have read those headlines, calling in a tip, if it wasn't a warning via international news wire as claimed by FDR White House insider Joseph Leib, a week in advance gave the rumor time to spread via word of mouth; did the Army actually go though that hospital tearing off the front page; if so, who ordered that and why exactly?
3. Even though it wasn't known from the intercepts of late November where exactly the attack would occur, anyone with at least half a brain back then and today who knows the balance of naval power in the pacific would know that the Japanese had just two choices:
a. Halt their aggression and retreat from territorial gains to lift the resource embargo (no freaking way) or
b. Go to war which, if they were to have ANY chance of winning or even reaching a stalemate after taking more territory to acquire embargoed resources would require them to knock out as much of the US fleet as possible in a surprise attack just as they did against the Russian fleet in the Battle of Port Arthur. As I documented above, at least one admiral, a Japanese military strategy expert and maybe another of the US Navy's very best admirals are on record as believing that. I have no doubt that many admirals and officers I haven't read about were just as smart about that. Heck, even the Marxist newsletter I linked to gave every period newspaper quote needed for anyone to agree with that assessment. The Japanese certainly seem to have agreed with that OBVIOUS strategy, no?
 
Last edited:
Oh, wow, just found this period piece. In so many ways it's a real gem of info. It explains why only Pearl sabotage and not air attack was expected (exactly for the reason I conjectured, now with official quote backup), why the Army must be blamed and not Kimmel even if it was expected, why the Army would conceivably have gone around ripping off front pages of the Hawaiian newspapers (exactly for the reason I conjectured, now with official quote backup), and in many excerpts not included, it gives some credence to the FDR White House insider Joseph Leib's story about Hull's admissions to him and his news release in the international news wire as an explanation for the still otherwise mysterious Hawaiian newspaper headlines.

https://www.antiwar.com/rep/flynn1.html

The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor
by John T. Flynn
October 1945 (published in the Chicago Tribune and elsewhere)

TINY excerpt:

What were Kimmel and Short told about all this? Literally nothing. Marshall was not in Washington, he left on the 27th to watch army maneuvers in North Carolina. Stimson, acting as Chief of Staff, sent Short a brief message. He called it a war warning. He said negotiations with Japan had ended – thus adopting the interpretation of Hull's note as an ultimatum which would be rejected. But he did not say we had given Japan an ultimatum. He said an aggressive move was expected in a few days. He warned "the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act." He said: "Prior to hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population (no alarming Hawaiian newspaper headlines in circulation, please - W] or disclose intent. Report measures taken." The whole message was cryptic and inadequate. But this was the fault of Stimson, not Marshall. Next day, Short, who was told to report what he was doing, sent a long message describing in detail the measures he had taken. The Army-Navy plan for defense of Hawaii called for three different types of action – called Alerts. Alert No. 1 was preparation against internal sabotage. Alert No. 2 was mobilization against external attack. Alert No. 3 was a signal for battle positions, when attack begins. Short put into effect Alert No. 1 – against sabotage and internal disorder. He had been warned several times about this. He had been warned that all Japanese movements indicated an attack thousands of miles from Pearl Harbor. During the next ten days, though he reported his course, he received no word from Washington ordering a different one.

Why the alert against sabotage, instead of against external air or submarine attack? The reader must have this very clearly in mind. Hawaii had 160,000 Japanese living there. It swarmed with Japanese spies. While the General Staff felt certain the attack would come at least 3,000 miles from Hawaii, they were profoundly frightened lest an internal movement of suicidal Japanese patriots would destroy planes and essential installations, crippling the base. Protection against sabotage called for a very different arrangement than from external attack. Short, and all his officers, were certain that is what the High Command indicated and he felt they knew more of the whole Pacific situation than he did. Kimmel, too, was warned not to do anything that would excite the civil population. Whatever he did must be done secretly. Both were warned not even to let their own officers in on these facts save where essential. And they were told "hostilities would begin soon" – but against the Kra Peninsula, Guam, Singapore, Malay.

What was Kimmel doing? It is forgotten that Kimmel's fleet was not there to protect Pearl Harbor. The Harbor was there merely as a fuel and supply base for it. That fleet had a task assigned to it in case of war. The protection of the base would be the duty of the army and the base naval installations. We do not know what the task assigned to Kimmel was. But it is certain that had the Japanese overlooked Pearl Harbor and struck at the Philippines or Singapore alone, Kimmel and his fleet would have been off to sea instantly. Kimmel was preparing for the war task assigned to him, not merely for the protection of Pearl Harbor. We must also bear in mind that after November 27, General Short never received another message giving him any information about the international situation, That is difficult to believe, but it is true. And, we must ask, why was Short told to alert against sabotage while MacArthur in the Philippines was told to alert all out against instant attack?
 
Last edited:
You might also want to research Gen. William Mitchell's demonstration of aerial bombardment against naval vessels, his prediction of a Japanese attack and subsequent court martial.
 
Back
Top