737 shot down by trigger happy SAM crew?
- Thread starter Winston
- Start date
Help Support The Rocketry Forum:
MaxQ
Tripoli 2747
Last edited:
That's interesting. I don't know anything about the market, but it makes sense.
I'm just a poor old man. Never had money to invest.
I'm just a poor old man. Never had money to invest.
We were also told that manufacturing and manufacturing jobs had left the USA for good. Be careful when someone tells you that these trends are the unstoppable. Look at Japan. After WW II their manufacturing capability was decimated and there natural resources for steel manufacturing have always been poor. They are now the world's second largest manufacturer of steel.
Chuck,
You are being short-sighted . . . Politics is only one possibility. Religious aspects may also come into play . . . Islam vs. Christianity or Judaism ( Israel ).
Whenever the Middle East is involved, it's inevitable !
Dave F.
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
IFF should have told them all they needed to know even without speed and path analysis. Something very important not considered in this article: was there widespread IFF jamming occurring due to jamming from US aircraft outside of Iranian airspace after the Iranian missiles were launched, that jamming in preparation for a US and/or Israeli strike should the Iranian missiles cause US casualties? You'd think the Iranians would say that if that was the case. However, that would also reveal the effectiveness of the jamming and their corresponding weakness.
How Iran Could Have Mistakenly Shot Down A 737 Airliner
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremy...ken-a-737-for-a-military-threat/#2734bf8122e3
A properly functioning SA-15 battery would have had multiple means of identifying Ukrainian International Airways Flight PS 752 as a civilian aircraft, defense experts told Forbes. One of several head-scratchers about the incident is that radar should have shown that the Boeing 737-800 was on a commonly used flight path heading northwest from the airport—if it was inbound into the country it would be easier to explain the misidentification of the plane as a hostile aircraft, says David Deptula, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general who heads the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
“There are a lot of question marks as to why and how this could have happened,” he says.
The Boeing 737-800 was transmitting a unique transponder identification code. If the equipment on the SA-15 that picks that up, called an IFF interrogator, was malfunctioning, battery operators would typically look at the schedule of airline traffic through their area and see if the target matched with a scheduled flight, Deptula says. Flight PS 752 was delayed by almost an hour from its scheduled departure, taking off at 6:12 a.m.
The SA-15 operators also would have considered the path and speed of the plane on radar. “Is it operating at low altitude, at high speed, headed toward a sensitive area”? Deptula asks. Flight PS 752 was rising toward 8,000 feet at a relatively sedate speed of 275 knots when flight tracking data from its transponder cut out, a normal profile for an airliner, he says. “It is departing the area, climbing through medium altitude, not trying to hide its signature, looking like a routine operation.”
If the unit didn’t rush, they should have had sufficient time to make a considered decision as to whether to launch an interceptor, says Carlo Kopp, cofounder of the think tank Air Power Australia. It’s unknown if Iran has integrated its SA-15 batteries with its broader air defense radar network. If the SA-15 unit in question was operating independently, the operators’ visibility would have been constrained to its relatively short radar range of 11 to 13.5 miles. Its missiles have a maximum range of 7.5 miles. Given the slow speed of the 737, if the plane grazed the edge of the battery’s missile range, the operators would have had a decision window of 1 minute and 53 seconds, Kopp calculates. If it directly overflew the launcher, the soldiers would have had 3 minutes and 39 seconds.
Given the multiple means of detection and the distinctive flight profile of an airliner, there’s no excuse for the deadly mistake, says Kopp. “The only credible explanation is incompetence,” he says.
Iranian air defense forces haven’t been seriously tested since the Iran-Iraq War and their level of training is a question mark.
In 2007 and 2008, Iranian air defense units mistakenly fired on two airliners amid fears that Israel was planning to attack its nuclear weapons development facilities, according to a classified Pentagon report obtained by the New York Times. Iranian air defense forces believed enemy aircraft might mimic the flight profile of an airliner, the report said.
Iran acquired 29 SA-15 units from Russia in 2007; Russians likely trained Iranian instructors on the system, who in turn trained the operational crews, says Kopp.
“There is no evidence that Iran is training its missileers any better than the Russians do,” Kopp says. Russia has been linked to two mistakenly downed aircraft in recent years. Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine in 2014; a Dutch-led investigation concluded it was hit by a Buk missile fired from a launcher that had been brought in from Russia. In 2018, a Russian Il-18 COOT electronic intelligence plane was shot down in Syria by a Russian-made, Syrian Army S-200V long-range missile battery that was reportedly overseen by Russian military advisers.
How Iran Could Have Mistakenly Shot Down A 737 Airliner
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremy...ken-a-737-for-a-military-threat/#2734bf8122e3
A properly functioning SA-15 battery would have had multiple means of identifying Ukrainian International Airways Flight PS 752 as a civilian aircraft, defense experts told Forbes. One of several head-scratchers about the incident is that radar should have shown that the Boeing 737-800 was on a commonly used flight path heading northwest from the airport—if it was inbound into the country it would be easier to explain the misidentification of the plane as a hostile aircraft, says David Deptula, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general who heads the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
“There are a lot of question marks as to why and how this could have happened,” he says.
The Boeing 737-800 was transmitting a unique transponder identification code. If the equipment on the SA-15 that picks that up, called an IFF interrogator, was malfunctioning, battery operators would typically look at the schedule of airline traffic through their area and see if the target matched with a scheduled flight, Deptula says. Flight PS 752 was delayed by almost an hour from its scheduled departure, taking off at 6:12 a.m.
The SA-15 operators also would have considered the path and speed of the plane on radar. “Is it operating at low altitude, at high speed, headed toward a sensitive area”? Deptula asks. Flight PS 752 was rising toward 8,000 feet at a relatively sedate speed of 275 knots when flight tracking data from its transponder cut out, a normal profile for an airliner, he says. “It is departing the area, climbing through medium altitude, not trying to hide its signature, looking like a routine operation.”
If the unit didn’t rush, they should have had sufficient time to make a considered decision as to whether to launch an interceptor, says Carlo Kopp, cofounder of the think tank Air Power Australia. It’s unknown if Iran has integrated its SA-15 batteries with its broader air defense radar network. If the SA-15 unit in question was operating independently, the operators’ visibility would have been constrained to its relatively short radar range of 11 to 13.5 miles. Its missiles have a maximum range of 7.5 miles. Given the slow speed of the 737, if the plane grazed the edge of the battery’s missile range, the operators would have had a decision window of 1 minute and 53 seconds, Kopp calculates. If it directly overflew the launcher, the soldiers would have had 3 minutes and 39 seconds.
Given the multiple means of detection and the distinctive flight profile of an airliner, there’s no excuse for the deadly mistake, says Kopp. “The only credible explanation is incompetence,” he says.
Iranian air defense forces haven’t been seriously tested since the Iran-Iraq War and their level of training is a question mark.
In 2007 and 2008, Iranian air defense units mistakenly fired on two airliners amid fears that Israel was planning to attack its nuclear weapons development facilities, according to a classified Pentagon report obtained by the New York Times. Iranian air defense forces believed enemy aircraft might mimic the flight profile of an airliner, the report said.
Iran acquired 29 SA-15 units from Russia in 2007; Russians likely trained Iranian instructors on the system, who in turn trained the operational crews, says Kopp.
“There is no evidence that Iran is training its missileers any better than the Russians do,” Kopp says. Russia has been linked to two mistakenly downed aircraft in recent years. Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine in 2014; a Dutch-led investigation concluded it was hit by a Buk missile fired from a launcher that had been brought in from Russia. In 2018, a Russian Il-18 COOT electronic intelligence plane was shot down in Syria by a Russian-made, Syrian Army S-200V long-range missile battery that was reportedly overseen by Russian military advisers.
Last edited:
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
On my IFF jamming conjecture:
Russia Re-ups Offer To Arm Iraq With S-400 Air Defenses As Relations With The U.S. Sour
Russia and China have both offered Iraq advanced weaponry and other military aid as its relations with the United States are now in doubt.
JANUARY 7, 2020
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...0-air-defenses-as-relations-with-the-u-s-sour
Hmmmm, why would they do that now?
The US had previously discouraged the Russians from selling the Iranians the S-400 system and, as I've previously pointed out:
https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...ability-by-air-force-sec.156893/#post-1950748
https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...ability-by-air-force-sec.156893/#post-1951165
if you read between the lines, US and Israeli F-35s can perhaps fly with impunity over Iran since they only have the S-300 system.
So, on my IFF jamming theory: do stealth aircraft transmit IFF? Hell, no, that would defeat the purpose of the stealth. So, if you were going to attack using only stealth aircraft, what would be the advantage of jamming the IFF of the country you are attacking? Simple: they'd have much greater chances of poorly trained SAM crews shooting down only their military aircraft (and, perhaps, civilian aircraft), the stealth aircraft being entirely undetected.
Russia Re-ups Offer To Arm Iraq With S-400 Air Defenses As Relations With The U.S. Sour
Russia and China have both offered Iraq advanced weaponry and other military aid as its relations with the United States are now in doubt.
JANUARY 7, 2020
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...0-air-defenses-as-relations-with-the-u-s-sour
Hmmmm, why would they do that now?
The US had previously discouraged the Russians from selling the Iranians the S-400 system and, as I've previously pointed out:
https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...ability-by-air-force-sec.156893/#post-1950748
https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...ability-by-air-force-sec.156893/#post-1951165
if you read between the lines, US and Israeli F-35s can perhaps fly with impunity over Iran since they only have the S-300 system.
So, on my IFF jamming theory: do stealth aircraft transmit IFF? Hell, no, that would defeat the purpose of the stealth. So, if you were going to attack using only stealth aircraft, what would be the advantage of jamming the IFF of the country you are attacking? Simple: they'd have much greater chances of poorly trained SAM crews shooting down only their military aircraft (and, perhaps, civilian aircraft), the stealth aircraft being entirely undetected.
You can start to see why the U.S. would not want Turkey to have both Russian anti-aircraft missiles and U.S. F-35's. There would be opportunity for the Turks and the Russians to get more familiar with accommodating their missiles with F-35's.
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
EXACTLY. That's 100% in line with the speculation of military columnists I've read on-line.
- Joined
- Jan 23, 2009
- Messages
- 5,982
- Reaction score
- 4,091
I am not totally buying this Turkey S-400 flap. I am putting a 15% chance this all orchestrated and one of those S-400 is being crawled all over by US Military and contractor engineers....
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
I am. It makes perfect sense according to the public domain information I've provided. Did you bother to read that? I have more. The possibility that the US or allies might have access to an S-400 is irrelevant to that.
Also, Israel has flown over Syria with their F-35s and there are S-400s in Syria. You can bet that they and our SIGINT satellites have monitored S-400 emissions to the hilt, so there's no need to take one apart to counter it or to guess what it might be able to do.
- Joined
- Jan 23, 2009
- Messages
- 5,982
- Reaction score
- 4,091
You do not need anything to GUESS what it can do. The IP is in the signal processing software, not what it emits. Public domain information is just conjecture at best and disinformation at worse.
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
From the PD info I provided which you obviously didn't read, it can be assumed pretty confidently that the S-300 system can't touch F-35s while the S-400s might be able to. However, the Israeli F-35s managed to avoid getting shot down by S-400s over Syria.
- Joined
- Jan 23, 2009
- Messages
- 5,982
- Reaction score
- 4,091
Please do not assume what I have read or not. I have been following the S-400 Turkey saga for quite some time. The fact that IDF F-35's were not shot down give absolutely no indication of the S-400 capabilities. (or the S-300's for that matter).
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
Well, have you? Please explain why the US wanted to stop and succeeded in stopping the Russian sale of S-400s to Iran? Please explain why, immediately after this recent hostility, the Russians are once again offering the S-400 to Iran. If Iranian S-300s can stop F-35s, please explain this:
The F-35 has already freaked out Iran and changed everything in the Middle East
JUL 18 2019
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/18/f-3...nd-changed-everything-in-the-middle-east.html
Why Israel's New F-35 Stealth Fighters Are a Game-Changer
Can nine F-35s really make a difference to the Middle Eastern balance of power?
Jan 2018
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/t...-f-35-stealth-fighters-are-game-changer-24217
Those two are in addition to other clues I've posted.
On S-400s and F-35s in Turkey, we get possible access to the S-400 while the Russians DON'T get access to the F-35 because we aren't selling them to Turkey.
Turkey's S-400 could give F-35s and F-22s a major advantage in a fight with Russia
Jul 18, 2019
https://www.businessinsider.com/turkeys-s400-f-35s-f-22s-a-boost-against-russia-2019-7
"For some reason coverage tends not to ask the question of how are Russians planning to deal with the potential problem of US intelligence being all over their system in Turkey," he said.
"Russians are not crying about selling their best tech to a NATO country, despite the obvious implications for technology access. That should make us wonder," he added.
Basically, while Russia's installation and support for S-400 systems in Turkey may give it intel on the F-35, Turkey, a NATO country, having Russia's best weapon against US airpower could spell doom for the system.
But the US's ability to take a look at Russia's S-400 "depends entirely on what conditions the Russians manage to hold the Turks to in terms of allowing NATO (US) access to inspect the system," Justin Bronk, an aerial-combat expert at the Royal United Services Institute, told Business Insider.
"It's potentially a very valuable source of previously unavailable information about a threat system, which is a specific priority for the alliance, and the US has never come into possession of an S-400 before," Bronk said. However, "it may be that the system is actually operated by and guarded by Russian personnel in Turkey, which could complicate things," he added.
Also, Russia's export version of the S-400 doesn't exactly match the version they use at home, but a former top US Air Force official told Business Insider that the US already had insight into Russia's anti-air capabilities and that the export version wasn't too far off from the genuine article.
"Russia will sell them to whomever will give them the cash," the source said, pointing to Russia's weak economy as an explanation for making the risky move of selling S-400 systems to a NATO country.
Winston
Lorenzo von Matterhorn
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2009
- Messages
- 9,560
- Reaction score
- 1,748
An article somewhere said that some US official had said that the SAM system lock-on had been detected and that two launches had occurred. The article also mentioned that that detection came from a satellite. I'd guess that a SIGINT satellite caught the lock-on signals and that an IR early warning satellite could see the heat signatures from the launches.
New Video Shows 2 Iranian Missiles Striking Doomed Passenger Jet
https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000006920114/iran-plane-missile-video.html
New Video Shows 2 Iranian Missiles Striking Doomed Passenger Jet
https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000006920114/iran-plane-missile-video.html
I am thinking that two different types of missiles were fired . . . The second missile seemed to be significantly faster than the first one !
Dave F.
Nytrunner
Pop lugs, not drugs
Similar threads
