Thoughts and Comments on Current Russian,Ukrainian Conflict/War

[user 30299]

For those of you that have time, and would enjoy reading proper & well written articles
about the Ukrainian and Russian war, and all things Putin, here is a link to an article from
the Foreign Affairs journal :

• The Kremlin’s Grand Delusions , https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/kremlins-grand-delusions

Also, I have attached two articles (PDF files) from Foreign Affairs.

• Putin's Last Stand
• The World Putin Wants

If you're not familiar with Foreign Affairs, it has been in existence since 1922. Articles and commentaries
are by the Who's who of politics, economics, military, think tanks, diplomats, statesmen, NGO's, all the
deep thinkers, advisors behind the curtains that influence government policy (and not just US gov't), etc.

Articles published in Foreign Affairs are meant (designed?) to be read, not skimmed. Best read with
your favorite cup of coffee or tea . . . . (alcoholic beverages are optional)

 

[Donnager]

FYI, the ammunition that Russia uses in their AK-74s is NOT the same as our 5.56, and is NOT compatible. 5.45x39 is not the same dimensions as 5.56x 45mm. Now there are some AK variants that are available in the US that are chambered for 5.56, like these: 5.56 AKs

I understand your Milspec research, but, Archer, Saiga, Izhmash, and others have made, and still make AK's (not all called-74's) with NATO chambering. While I don't know about all of them, I have dumped 5.56x45 and .223 casings out of my shirt when my neighbor shooter was going wild with his "AK-74".

Do you believe 4-6 year olds were/are actually doing maintenance on Russian combat rifles between the pants pooping and pee accidents?

Sometimes silly needs to be called out.

You are preaching to the choir here, I am a gun guy.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

You guys know about the Guns & Rockets thread? That’s a great place to post about guns without derailing non-gun threads like this one.

Here it is. Check it out! https://www.rocketryforum.com/threads/guns-rockets.69031/

 

[Peartree]

One year in and the Russians are going backwards with 100,000 dead. Ukraine, 13,000 dead.

Ukrainian population down by 8 million permanently displaced persons (almost 20 percent), while Russia's population is down by something like a half million (who have fled for various reasons).

Full text from NBC here

 

[boatgeek]

So in the spirit of @ThirstyBarbarian, I thought I'd go back and look at my early hot takes on this a year later to see if they aged like milk or wine. Here we go...

For the next year, they'd need a way to get the gas. There's no significant pipelines between Russia and China. While China could certainly build a fleet of LNG ships in a year or two, they'd need to also get liquefaction equipment to Russian ports. That will take a few years to build, and there will also be significant demand for liquefaction plants to supply Europe. Not to mention that Russian ports convenient to China are also icebound for much of the year. As of 2016, China accounted for only a couple of percent of Russian gas exports. It's really hard to ramp that up quickly.

I feel pretty good about this one. I don't think that Russia is exporting significant gas to China. Oil is another matter though.

Cutting Russia off from SWIFT will cause pretty serious economic damage in the near term. There's only so much that the Russian people will bear. Notably, over half of Russian exports are to EU, NATO, or allied countries. If they're cut off from hard currency, they're going to be in a world of hurt. Also, Putin isn't really going to like having Xi call his shots.

Not so much here. While there have been speed bumps, Russia's economy seems to be good enough for now to keep the population from getting too restive.

There are two things that worry me most about this conflict:
1. Putin needs to win if he commits forces*. He's committed something like 60% of his combat forces to this endeavor. If he goes in and Ukraine stops him, he's not going to get a second chance. Ukraine will join NATO as soon as possible before he rebuilds, and would probably advocate for an aggressive stance vis-a-vis Moscow. Plus there's an open question of whether Putin's regime would survive the fallout of losing a war with a smaller neighbor. A dictator with his back against the wall does ugly things if it looks like he might lose.

TBD. I still think that Putin will not survive losing, and ugly things have happened. I am less worried about nukes flying though.

2. Some non-zero percentage of the militias being organized in Ukraine right now are by the far right. If Russia "wins" and gets bogged down into a long-term insurgency, the far right is the group most likely to be running the insurgency. That puts us in exactly the same position we were in Afghanistan circa 1985: do we let the Russians run amok or do we arm people who (a) don't support our vision of society and (b) are likely to be actively hostile to us if they every beat the Russians. Look how well that one turned out for us.

Since Russia didn't steamroll Ukraine on the initial invasion, we haven't had to find out what an insurgency would look like.

* Incidentally, this is exactly why Ukraine would like to join NATO. Putin is highly unlikely to commit forces against all of NATO because he knows he isn't going to win. He might rattle his saber, but most people would know that it's a bluff. In some sense, Ukraine joining NATO reduces the chances of war.

This definitely seems to have borne out.

Weirdly, this gives me substantially more hope than I've had for a few days that major conflicts will be avoided. The reason is that this gives everyone an off-ramp. If Putin goes up to the Ukrainian line of control with his "peacekeeping" forces and stops, then everyone can claim victory. Putin gets to say that he never intended to invade Ukraine, he's just recognizing the pro-Russian breakaways. Ukraine is basically at status quo since they weren't going to get that territory back anyway. The West gets to put sanctions on a few oligarchs and maybe go after a bit of Putin's personal wealth.

Definitely didn't age well. Conflict was not avoided.

I don't know that Putin will take that off-ramp. But up until this announcement, it seemed like there was no other way off. If I were a betting man, I'd probably still put the chances of a Russian invasion at over 50-50, basically with Russian troops driving up to the line of control and pushing boundaries until the Ukrainians fire the first shot. But 25-75 odds against peace are better than 0-100.

I may as well mention here that the US and other Western powers have been absolutely on point with reporting out the Russian plans to provoke/false flag their way into a war. I can only imagine the Russian commanders pulling their hair out while they try to come up with another strategy.

 

[Sooner Boomer]

So Putin has finally had enough and launches ten nuke-tipped ICBMs at UKR.

3 are duds and don't launch
2 CATO
2 launch and come close to their targets, but are duds
1 launches, but heads towards Moscow, where it is shot down
the last 2 show up on ebay in Belarus

 

[PhilC]

For those of you that have time, and would enjoy reading proper & well written articles
about the Ukrainian and Russian war, and all things Putin, here is a link to an article from
the Foreign Affairs journal :

• The Kremlin’s Grand Delusions , https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/kremlins-grand-delusions

Also, I have attached two articles (PDF files) from Foreign Affairs.

• Putin's Last Stand
• The World Putin Wants

If you're not familiar with Foreign Affairs, it has been in existence since 1922. Articles and commentaries
are by the Who's who of politics, economics, military, think tanks, diplomats, statesmen, NGO's, all the
deep thinkers, advisors behind the curtains that influence government policy (and not just US gov't), etc.

Articles published in Foreign Affairs are meant (designed?) to be read, not skimmed. Best read with
your favorite cup of coffee or tea . . . . (alcoholic beverages are optional)

'Putins Last Stand' seems to align with some of my posts from late January on post-bellum Russia & the dangers of its collapse. Maybe I wasn't talking BS after all!

 

[user 30299]

'Putins Last Stand' seems to align with some of my posts from late January on post-bellum Russia & the dangers of its collapse. Maybe I wasn't talking BS after all!

Good to hear you read the article. Sounds like it gave you that pat on the back that you needed.

 

[dbpeirce]

I know we are supposed to be supplying Ukraine with Patriot missiles. Not sure if they got them yet but if they need to figure out the livery for them I built one for reference

 

[afadeev]

Another bit of something on where Ukraine and Europe are going, from a Canadian on the ground in Kiev, and Peter Zeihan.

I have to say that I agree with the last point:

• Belgium is a totally dysfunctional and useless country.
• I have close friends in Belgium who will be the first to agree with that as well.

 

[Greg Furtman]

An interesting article. And considering how much financial corruptions goes on in Russia their nukes may not work.

https://www.wired.com/story/nuclear-weapons-testing/

 

[boatgeek]

An interesting article. And considering how much financial corruptions goes on in Russia their nukes may not work.

https://www.wired.com/story/nuclear-weapons-testing/

Still, let's not find out, OK?

 

[smstachwick]

The Wagner Group can chalk up a victory in Bakhmut, at enormous cost in men and materiel.

https://www.wionews.com/world/ukrai...akhmut-town-as-russia-gains-upper-hand-568405
No word yet on where the Ukrainian forces plan to regroup.

 

[Peartree]

Oddly, while Ukraine seems to be staging a careful withdrawal, they're still holding much of Bhakmut. They're making Wagner group pay for every meter.

 

[afadeev]

Ukraine is building up its forces for an offensive:
https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/06/ukraine-is-building-up-its-forces-for-an-offensive
"On the other hand, Russia’s army is in dire shape. If, after conquering Bakhmut, it decides to plough on deeper into Donetsk, it will have to further run down its own meagre reserves. It might eventually start pulling units from other parts of the long front line, creating gaps that Ukraine can exploit, suggests Gustav Gressel of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. Ukraine’s allies are watching closely for weak points."

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

Ukraine is building up its forces for an offensive:
https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/06/ukraine-is-building-up-its-forces-for-an-offensive
"On the other hand, Russia’s army is in dire shape. If, after conquering Bakhmut, it decides to plough on deeper into Donetsk, it will have to further run down its own meagre reserves. It might eventually start pulling units from other parts of the long front line, creating gaps that Ukraine can exploit, suggests Gustav Gressel of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. Ukraine’s allies are watching closely for weak points."

It sounds like an interesting article, but unfortunately, it’s behind a paywall, and I don’t have a subscription. Does the Economist have “gift links” to share articles with non-subscribers? Sometimes I gift articles from the Washington Post or New York Times. I can share a certain number of articles per month.

 

[Greg Furtman]

It sounds like an interesting article, but unfortunately, it’s behind a paywall, and I don’t have a subscription. Does the Economist have “gift links” to share articles with non-subscribers? Sometimes I gift articles from the Washington Post or New York Times. I can share a certain number of articles per month.

@ThirstyBarbarian You don't need a subscription. You can set up a viewer account with an email address and a password.

 

[kuririn]

"On the other hand, Russia’s army is in dire shape.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...70-year-old-armored-tractors/?sh=5394d0b9112c

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

@ThirstyBarbarian You don't need a subscription. You can set up a viewer account with an email address and a password.

Thanks. I’ll try that.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...70-year-old-armored-tractors/?sh=5394d0b9112c

Can you imagine the despair of some hapless cannon-fodder conscript being shown to the vehicle he is going to take into combat?

The Russians are also reportedly sending attack waves of such totally unprepared troops that they really have no idea of their objective or tactics, and they just kind of move unpredictably around the battlefield until they are killed. With those kinds of troops, and these kinds of nearly useless vehicles, it seems like a mindless zombie apocalypse strategy of just tiring out the Ukrainians with overwhelming numbers of targets to kill. After awhile, won’t Russia run out of convicts and crap antique hardware to dispose of?

 

[smstachwick]

Can you imagine the despair of some hapless cannon-fodder conscript being shown to the vehicle he is going to take into combat?

The Russians are also reportedly sending attack waves of such totally unprepared troops that they really have no idea of their objective or tactics, and they just kind of move unpredictably around the battlefield until they are killed. With those kinds of troops, and these kinds of nearly useless vehicles, it seems like a mindless zombie apocalypse strategy of just tiring out the Ukrainians with overwhelming numbers of targets to kill. After awhile, won’t Russia run out of convicts and crap antique hardware to dispose of?

Russia has devoted a lot of its internal economic power to the production of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. So long as they’re not too complex in design, they could continue making them and the limiting factor won’t be raw materials or components or anything like that.

If anything it’ll be the bodies. An economy depends on its workers far more than it depends on its CEOs and oligarchs. You could defenstrate a large percentage of the corporate leadership without adverse effect on the state or any economic sector (including defense), but sending even a minuscule percentage of the labor force to an early grave will wreak havoc on production. We saw this in the truly dark stages of the pandemic and we still haven’t fully recovered.

 

[afadeev]

It sounds like an interesting article, but unfortunately, it’s behind a paywall, and I don’t have a subscription. Does the Economist have “gift links” to share articles with non-subscribers? Sometimes I gift articles from the Washington Post or New York Times. I can share a certain number of articles per month.

Sorry about that - I lost track of which links are behind paywalls vs. not.
Luckily, it appears one can get limited access to Economist (and Forbes, and other sites) for free?

Whichever way Bahmut battle turns (town has no strategic and only emotional value), it is remarkable that Russia may run out of tanks altogether in about a year. I recall we were having fun speculating about Ukrainians and Poles employing winged Husars earlier in this thread, but it looks like it may be Russians employing cavalry this time next year. If they last that long, at all.

• Russia widened its war in Ukraine in February 2022 with a front-line force of around 2,500 T-90, T-80 and T-72 tanks. In a year of hard fighting, it has lost no fewer than 1,600 of them.
• Uralvagonzavod in Sverdlovsk Oblast, in southeast Russia, builds new T-72B3 and T-90M tanks, but slowly. According to Novaya Gazeta, the Russian defense industry currently produces no more than 250 new tanks a year.
• Russia might have as few as 3,800 repairable tanks in reserve. A Russian source told Novaya Gazeta that Uralvagonzavod and Siberia-based Omsktransmash can restore 600 old tanks a year on top of the 250 new T-72s and T-90s Uralvagonzavod can build.
• Do the math. Russia went to war with 2,500 tanks, lost 1,600 in the first year and, over the same span of time, might have built or repaired around 850.
  • In 2.25 years from the start of the invasion (2Q'24), Russian may be down to 0 tanks.

Source:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=193192142061

 

[kuririn]

Russia may be a bigger weapons supplier to Ukraine than the entirety of NATO countries:
https://armyrecognition.com/ukraine...orial Defense Forces, and the National Guard.

 

[smstachwick]

Sorry about that - I lost track of which links are behind paywalls vs. not.
Luckily, it appears one can get limited access to Economist (and Forbes, and other sites) for free?

Whichever way Bahmut battle turns (town has no strategic and only emotional value), it is remarkable that Russia may run out of tanks altogether in about a year. I recall we were having fun speculating about Ukrainians and Poles employing winged Husars earlier in this thread, but it looks like it may be Russians employing cavalry this time next year. If they last that long, at all.

• Russia widened its war in Ukraine in February 2022 with a front-line force of around 2,500 T-90, T-80 and T-72 tanks. In a year of hard fighting, it has lost no fewer than 1,600 of them.
• Uralvagonzavod in Sverdlovsk Oblast, in southeast Russia, builds new T-72B3 and T-90M tanks, but slowly. According to Novaya Gazeta, the Russian defense industry currently produces no more than 250 new tanks a year.
• Russia might have as few as 3,800 repairable tanks in reserve. A Russian source told Novaya Gazeta that Uralvagonzavod and Siberia-based Omsktransmash can restore 600 old tanks a year on top of the 250 new T-72s and T-90s Uralvagonzavod can build.
• Do the math. Russia went to war with 2,500 tanks, lost 1,600 in the first year and, over the same span of time, might have built or repaired around 850.
  • In 2.25 years from the start of the invasion (2Q'24), Russian may be down to 0 tanks.

Source:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=193192142061

And you don’t need to reduce the enemy to 0 tanks to conduct defensive operations.

 

[Antares JS]

Russia may be a bigger weapons supplier to Ukraine than the entirety of NATO countries:

 

[Peartree]

Can you imagine the despair of some hapless cannon-fodder conscript being shown to the vehicle he is going to take into combat?

The Russians are also reportedly sending attack waves of such totally unprepared troops that they really have no idea of their objective or tactics, and they just kind of move unpredictably around the battlefield until they are killed. With those kinds of troops, and these kinds of nearly useless vehicles, it seems like a mindless zombie apocalypse strategy of just tiring out the Ukrainians with overwhelming numbers of targets to kill. After awhile, won’t Russia run out of convicts and crap antique hardware to dispose of?

I can't even begin to find it at this point, but a few days ago I saw a quote by one of the Ukrainian commanders that their general concern was that there were more Russians coming at them than they had ammunition to kill them all. That seems to be a (tragic) intent of the Russians is to use human wave assaults until Ukraine has to give up territory just to reload. The U.S. saw similar tactics by North Koreans and Chinese in the Korean conflict and by the N. Vietnamese (though typically not by the NVA "regulars" (as I understand it).

 

[PhilC]

Sorry about that - I lost track of which links are behind paywalls vs. not.
Luckily, it appears one can get limited access to Economist (and Forbes, and other sites) for free?

Whichever way Bahmut battle turns (town has no strategic and only emotional value), it is remarkable that Russia may run out of tanks altogether in about a year. I recall we were having fun speculating about Ukrainians and Poles employing winged Husars earlier in this thread, but it looks like it may be Russians employing cavalry this time next year. If they last that long, at all.

• Russia widened its war in Ukraine in February 2022 with a front-line force of around 2,500 T-90, T-80 and T-72 tanks. In a year of hard fighting, it has lost no fewer than 1,600 of them.
• Uralvagonzavod in Sverdlovsk Oblast, in southeast Russia, builds new T-72B3 and T-90M tanks, but slowly. According to Novaya Gazeta, the Russian defense industry currently produces no more than 250 new tanks a year.
• Russia might have as few as 3,800 repairable tanks in reserve. A Russian source told Novaya Gazeta that Uralvagonzavod and Siberia-based Omsktransmash can restore 600 old tanks a year on top of the 250 new T-72s and T-90s Uralvagonzavod can build.
• Do the math. Russia went to war with 2,500 tanks, lost 1,600 in the first year and, over the same span of time, might have built or repaired around 850.
  • In 2.25 years from the start of the invasion (2Q'24), Russian may be down to 0 tanks.

Source:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=193192142061

According to Sky News Russia is losing about 120 tanks per month and has the capacity to manufacture about 20 tanks per month. That doesn't sound very sustainable.

 

[boatgeek]

I can't even begin to find it at this point, but a few days ago I saw a quote by one of the Ukrainian commanders that their general concern was that there were more Russians coming at them than they had ammunition to kill them all. That seems to be a (tragic) intent of the Russians is to use human wave assaults until Ukraine has to give up territory just to reload. The U.S. saw similar tactics by North Koreans and Chinese in the Korean conflict and by the N. Vietnamese (though typically not by the NVA "regulars" (as I understand it).

I can dig up sources if desired, but current estimates are that the Russians are losing 5 to 7 soldiers for every one Ukrainian. Most of the losses appear to be relatively low-training mobilized troops on both sides, though the failed assaults on Vulhedar likely took out most an "elite" unit. Turns out that driving full speed into minefields is a lousy way to make it to the end of the day.

 

[OzHybrid]

Ukraine is not worth starting world war 3 over. Even if Russia does invade, I doubt the west will take any military action to stop them.

Ukraine is the wheat belt for Europe. It is a buffer zone for Europe and Russia. So has significant negative impacts if taken by Russia.

 

[smstachwick]

Ukraine is the wheat belt for Europe. It is a buffer zone for Europe and Russia. So has significant negative impacts if taken by Russia.

I think that has to be a record for lateness of reply.