Thoughts and Comments on Current Russian,Ukrainian Conflict/War

[Steve Shannon]

The ammunition is a NATO standard 35 mm x 228 mm. It’s inconceivable that the Swiss would be the only manufacturer of ammunition. This is rather hypocritical of the Swiss anyway. They had no problems providing that ammo to other countries who fight wars.

From the Internet:
The 35x228 Oerlikon KD series was developed in the 1960s to replace the Swiss 34mm Flab Kan 38 AA gun. The AA gun has been exported to many different countries and remains in wide service today, including being produced in China. It is always found in twin mountings, towed, mounted on vehicles or fitted to turrets (the best known being the German Flakpanzer Gepard). In addition, a slower-firing long-recoil Oerlikon KDE using the same ammunition was developed for the ground-firing role in light AFVs; this has only been adopted by Japan. The most recent Oerlikon gun development is the KDG revolver cannon which fires at no less than 1,000 rpm. This is offered in single mountings for both land and naval use.

The ammunition has developed too, the latest type being the KETF (Kinetic Energy Time Fuzed), formerly known as AHEAD, which is an advanced shrapnel type. Different versions of this have been developed for AA/anti-missile and anti-personnel roles.

During the 1980s Rheinmetall started developing the Rh 503, an externally-powered weapon available with two barrels; one to take the standard 35x228 ammo, the other to take a 50x330 "Supershot" round. The reason for the 50mm is to provide the biggest possible "piston area" for firing saboted rounds, particularly the APFSDS, with the bonus of firing a bigger HE shell. It was intended for the next generation of German AFVs (starting with the 35mm caliber, with the 50mm available as a later upgrade if required) but the end of the Cold War put a stop to it, Germany having selected the cheaper option of a 30mm Mauser cannon for their new light AFVs.

The overall length of the two cartridges is the same; only a small part of the sabot protrudes above the neck of the 50mm case, so little more than a barrel change is required.

ATK (or to be precise one of their earlier incarnations - anyone who can keep track of the endlessly shifting paternity of military weapons deserves a medal) has developed a version of the Chain Gun family - the Bushmaster III - to use the same 35x228 ammunition. This has been adopted by Denmark and the Netherlands in their CV9035 MICVs.

 

[rcktnut]

They will get their ammo, Items #111-113: Ammunition-Handbook-ver-6-2021.pdf (nammo.com)

 

[georgegassaway]

Maybe. Maybe not. Apparently the Swiss manufacture the guns for the German Gepards and their contract says that they have veto authority on any downstream sales. So, at the moment, from what I read, the Germans might be able to send the Gepards, but they can't send any ammunition (which would make sending them rather pointless).

Hmmm. But if Germany GIVES (or loans) them, that would not be a sale. Of course perhaps the contract would cover that as well.

 

[afadeev]

Interesting analysis of a number of factors and recent developments in Ukraine:

• Russia has achieved tactical air superiority in Donbas, but it doesn't matter. Russian Air Force is structurally unable to provide effective close air support with PGMs. And delivering unguided weapons from lower altitudes makes them increasingly vulnerable to AAA and manpads.
• Russian army is still bogged down all across the front line in South/Eastern Ukraine, and is taking heavy losses in what is becoming a medium-term conflict of attrition. Which Russia is loosing.
• Russia started the war with ~120 BTGs deployed into Ukraine, or ~75% of its usable manpower out of the total of ~160-168 BTGs that Russia can put together over its entire territory with all the equipment and trained forces during peacetime. The rest are not going anywhere, as they are covering Russia's vast borders.
  • 1 BTG is assigned 10 tanks (when fully equipped), so ~1,200 tanks deployed into Ukraine. There have been 530+ visually confirmed Russian tanks lost to date, so we are approaching a catastrophic 50% loss ratio.
  • US Army doctrine from 2017-18 estimated that to render 1 Russian BTG combat ineffective, you need to destroy 3-4 tanks and similar proportion of other vehicles. By that logic, Russian army is approaching that threshold for the entire force deployed into Ukraine.
  • Russia can't easily backfill either the tanks (those in storage are old, under-equipped, and in mostly crap state), nor the crews.
• National endurance and equipment supply considerations are not in Russia's favor, and they are rapidly running out of time until the entire attacking force becomes mostly combat ineffective.
• In 2-3 weeks, when that is expected to happen, and Ukraine starts counter-attacking, Russians will be largely out of usable combat power. The only way to avoid full collapse of the Russian army is to feed it more raw conscripts, which are not particularly effective, but better than a total collapse.
• Those 2-3 weeks bring us right upto the presumed 9th or May target for Putin to declare "victory".
  • The opposite is now more likely to happen - Putin will use that event to broadcast declaration of an all-out war on Ukraine to call up all available reserved to prevent the rout.
• Russians brandish Nukes a lot, but purely for deterrence. They are using threat of Nukes to achieve exactly what Nukes are designed to achieve - keep conventional conflicts contained, and prevent them from spilling into something much larger. Nuclear deterrence works both ways, as always.
• There is no feasible way for any Ukrainian leader to stop at anything short of fully recovering the territory lost post 2/24 invasion. More likely, anything short of recovering entire LDR + DPR territories. Not clear if Crimea is on the menu as well.
• Among other motivations, Putin is desperate to absorb Ukraine and Belarus now to offset horrendous demographic declines in Russia. Thus the forced deportations of Ukrainians into far East, and (barbaric) forced adoptions of Ukrainian children separated from their families.
• The criticism of EU's continued purchases of Russian gas and oil is not as simple as it sounds. If EU stops buying Russian carbohydrates (pipes can not be easily rerouted), we would be taking 15-20% of gas supply off the market, and would effectively crash the global energy market.
  • EU will recover by outbidding the rest of the world to replace gas supplies from other sources, but will do so at the expanse of the developing world.
  • Indian subcontinent, South America and Africa will be on the loosing end of the gas supply shortage, crashing most of those economies.
  • There is also an upcoming food crises in Middle East and Africa, who normally get bulk of their grain supplies from Ukraine and Russia.
    • Which is why much of Middle East, Africa, and Indian sub-continent are nowhere close to supporting the US and the West in the conflict with Russia.

 

[Peartree]

• There is no feasible way for any Ukrainian leaders to stop at anything short of fully recovering the territory lost post 2/24 invasion. More likely, anything short of recovering entire LDR + DPR territories. Not clear if Crimea is on the menu as well.

Presuming, as noted in previous bullet points, that the Russian military is facing a full-on collapse, then, strategically speaking, why *wouldn't* Ukraine try to recover Crimea? For that matter, if the entire Russian military is deployed (and getting its kiester handed to it) in Ukraine, why wouldn't the rebels in Chechnya and Georgia (and maybe even Belarus) decide that now is a good time to stir things up and make another run at independence?

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

Interesting analysis of a number of factors and recent developments in Ukraine:

• Russia has achieved tactical air superiority in Donbas, but it doesn't matter. Russian Air Force is structurally unable to provide effective close air support with PGMs. And delivering unguided weapons from lower altitudes makes them increasingly vulnerable to AAA and manpads.
• Russian army is still bogged down all across the front line in South/Eastern Ukraine, and is taking heavy losses in what is becoming a medium-term conflict of attrition. Which Russia is loosing.
• Russia started the war with ~120 BTGs deployed into Ukraine, or ~75% of its usable manpower out of the total of ~160-168 BTG that Russia can put together over its entire territory with all the equipment and trained forces during peacetime. The rest are not going anywhere, as they are covering Russia's vast borders.
  • 1 BTG is assigned 10 tanks (when fully equipped), so ~1,200 tanks deployed into Ukraine. There have been 530+ visually confirmed Russian tanks lost to date, so we are approaching a catastrophic 50% loss ratio.
  • US Army doctrine from 2017-18 estimated that to render 1 Russian BTG combat ineffective, you need to destroy 3-4 tanks and similar proportion of other vehicles. By that logic, Russian army is approaching that threshold for the entire force deployed into Ukraine.
  • Russia can't easily backfill either the tanks (those in storage are old, under-equipped, and in mostly crap state), nor the crews.
• National endurance and equipment supply considerations are not in Russia's favor, and they are rapidly running out of time until the entire attacking force becomes mostly combat ineffective.
• In 2-3 weeks, when that is expected to happen, and Ukraine starts counter-attacking, Russians will be largely out of usable combat power. The only way to avoid full collapse of the Russian army is to feed it more raw conscripts, which are not particularly effective, but better than a total collapse.
• Those 2-3 weeks bring us right upto the presumed 9th or May target for Putin to declare "victory".
  • The opposite is now more likely to happen - Putin will use that event to broadcast declaration of an all-out war on Ukraine to call up all available reserved to prevent the rout.
• Russians brandish Nukes a lot, but purely for deterrence. They are using threat of Nukes to achieve exactly what Nukes are designed to achieve - keep conventional conflicts contained, and prevent them from spilling into something much larger. Nuclear deterrence works both ways, as always.
• There is no feasible way for any Ukrainian leader to stop at anything short of fully recovering the territory lost post 2/24 invasion. More likely, anything short of recovering entire LDR + DPR territories. Not clear if Crimea is on the menu as well.
• Among other motivations, Putin is desperate to absorb Ukraine and Belarus now to offset horrendous demographic declines in Russia. Thus the forced deportations of Ukrainians into far East, and (barbaric) forced adoptions of Ukrainian children separated from their families.
• The criticism of EU's continued purchases of Russian gas and oil is not as simple as it sounds. If EU stops buying Russian carbohydrates (pipes can not be easily rerouted), we would be taking 15-20% of gas supply off the market, and would effectively crash the global energy market.
  • EU will recover by outbidding the rest of the world to replace gas supplies from other sources, but will do so at the expanse of the developing world.
  • Indian subcontinent, South America and Africa will be on the loosing end of the gas supply shortage, crashing most of those economies.
  • There is also an upcoming food crises in Middle East and Africa, who normally get bulk of their grain supplies from Ukraine and Russia.
    • Which is why much of Middle East, Africa, and Indian sub-continent are nowhere close to supporting the US and the West in the conflict with Russia.

It’s interesting how much this war has degraded so much of Russia’s total military capacity, not just the invading force. They committed so much of their total capacity to this fight and are getting beaten so badly, it’s going to affect their entire military. I think this is what Defense Secretary Austin was referring to when he said we want to see Russia weakened to the point that they won’t have the ability to do this kind of thing again.

Right now, it feels like there is a race between Russia’s ability to reconstitute the decimated BTGs and make a breakthrough in its invasion versus the Ukrainians ability to get the western-supplied heavy equipment integrated into its forces and make its own breakthrough. I agree with the point made in this analysis that a lot will be decided in the next 2-3 weeks.

My feeling is that in this race, Russia probably isn’t going to be able to pull it off. They’ve been too battered to pull themselves together and make any significant headway. I think Ukraine will be able to hold them off long enough to get the heavy weapons into the fight, and then they will have the capacity to press their own counter attack. I think they will drive the Russians out, and they may be able to destroy or capture a lot of Russia’s military capacity in the process. It would be great if a lot of the invading forces never make it home.

 

[rharshberger]

It’s interesting how much this war has degraded so much of Russia’s total military capacity, not just the invading force. They committed so much of their total capacity to this fight and are getting beaten so badly, it’s going to affect their entire military. I think this is what Defense Secretary Austin was referring to when he said we want to see Russia weakened to the point that they won’t have the ability to do this kind of thing again.

Right now, it feels like there is a race between Russia’s ability to reconstitute the decimated BTGs and make a breakthrough in its invasion versus the Ukrainians ability to get the western-supplied heavy equipment integrated into its forces and make its own breakthrough. I agree with the point made in this analysis that a lot will be decided in the next 2-3 weeks.

My feeling is that in this race, Russia probably isn’t going to be able to pull it off. They’ve been too battered to pull themselves together and make any significant headway. I think Ukraine will be able to hold them off long enough to get the heavy weapons into the fight, and then they will have the capacity to press their own counter attack. I think they will drive the Russians out, and they may be able to destroy or capture a lot of Russia’s military capacity in the process. It would be great if a lot of the invading forces never make it home.

I agree with most of your thoughts, but I think Russia is desperate enough to win that they will do something drastic and not just threaten to use certain devices.

 

[afadeev]

Presuming, as noted in previous bullet points, that the Russian military is facing a full-on collapse, then, strategically speaking, why *wouldn't* Ukraine try to recover Crimea? For that matter, if the entire Russian military is deployed (and getting its kiester handed to it) in Ukraine, why wouldn't the rebels in Chechnya and Georgia (and maybe even Belarus) decide that now is a good time to stir things up and make another run at independence?

+ Wipe out Russian protectorate in Moldova.
The situation in Chechnya is funny, since Kadyrov is actively contributing troops to fighting for Putin in Ukraine.

Crimean situation is a little different. Kicking Russia out of Crimea will mean wiping out Russian Black Sea fleet once and for all, as well as any possibility of it ever coming back. While that fleet has lost much of its firepower and practical use after multiple ships went snorkeling (with more likely joining them soon), writing off the entire fleet and access to Crimea for good would be a historical humiliation for Russia and Putin. If you trust Wikipedia, Crimea was first annexed by Empress Catherine and her boyfriend Potemkin in 1783:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Empire
Russians might get emotional about this.

a

 

[afadeev]

I agree with most of your thoughts, but I think Russia is desperate enough to win that they will do something drastic and not just threaten to use certain devices.

The most interesting question is whether or not Putin thinks, or knows, that he might actually be loosing!?

He seams to live in his own reality universe, in which everyone is always telling him how great he is, and how much he is winning all the time. It is not clear how many people dare to tell him the truth, at the risk of their own life and limb (and that of their families).



a

 

[boatgeek]

I agree with most of your thoughts, but I think Russia is desperate enough to win that they will do something drastic and not just threaten to use certain devices.

The most interesting question is whether or not Putin thinks, or knows, that he might actually be loosing!?

He seams to live in his own reality universe, in which everyone is always telling him how great he is, and how much he is winning all the time. It is not clear how many people dare to tell him the truth, at the risk of their own life and limb (and that of their families).

The Austrian [PM or president] went to Moscow a week or so ago and came back reporting that Putin thinks he's winning. I read a comment elsewhere that the reports up the chain of command seem to go:
Lieutenant: "We're under heavy attack, but we might hold"
Captain: "It's bad, but we're holding"
Colonel: "We're holding"
General: "The situation is very promising."
Defense Minister: "Everything is going to plan!"

It would not surprise me if Putin ordered use of nukes to keep from losing. I wonder if the generals will follow that order. They must know that they'll be hunted down and rot in a jail cell for the rest of their lives if they do, but they and their families might be killed if they don't.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

I agree with most of your thoughts, but I think Russia is desperate enough to win that they will do something drastic and not just threaten to use certain devices.

It’s a possibility. I still think the likelihood is low, but you can’t rule it out.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

The most interesting question is whether or not Putin thinks, or knows, that he might actually be loosing!?

He seams to live in his own reality universe, in which everyone is always telling him how great he is, and how much he is winning all the time. It is not clear how many people dare to tell him the truth, at the risk of their own life and limb (and that of their families).

View attachment 516282

a

Maybe they’ll keep telling him they are winning and just continue marching new conscripts into the grinder. But it seems like sooner or later, the truth will assert self and be impossible to ignore.

 

[tsmmiller]

Petunia seems to be exhibiting signs of Parkinson's Disease.
I've seen videos where he walks with the stiff gait and seems rigid. The expressionless mask of a face, a few more.
How might that affect his thought processes?

 

[smstachwick]

The expressionless mask of a face, a few more.

Actually there’s a perfectly benign explanation for that: he’s Russian.

 

[boatgeek]

Petunia seems to be exhibiting signs of Parkinson's Disease.
I've seen videos where he walks with the stiff gait and seems rigid. The expressionless mask of a face, a few more.
How might that affect his thought processes?

I mean, he was a KGB agent, so he probably has a pretty good poker face. Parkinson's runs in my family. It didn't manifest in my relatives like what you describe above, but Parkinson's can definitely manifest differently in different people. My relatives have obvious tremors and relatively little cognitive impact until very late in the progression of the disease.

 

[kuririn]

There are two videos I've seen where he has tremors in his right hand. One video shows him meeting with an official, seated at a table with his right hand grabbing the corner of the table for several minutes. Who grabs the corner of a table for several minutes? I think it's to prevent his right hand from shaking.

 

[afadeev]

The expressionless mask of a face, a few more.

Actually there’s a perfectly benign explanation for that: he’s Russian.

Or, he might be smiling, the funky Russian way, like these guys do in the group photos:

 

[smstachwick]

Or, he might be smiling, the funky Russian way, like these guys do in the group photos:

View attachment 516315

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

I don’t know if Putin is dying, but I sure hope he is. The sooner the better, and hopefully it’s horrible.

I thought at one point maybe Putin might be sick and trying to secure a legacy. But now I don’t really think he cares about a legacy. And I also don’t think he is really all that motivated by a desire to Make Russia Great Again, although he is using that idea to rally his country.

I’m sick of psychoanalyzing these garbage authoritarians (and wannabe authoritarians) to try to figure out their motivations for doing things not in their nations’ interests. When it doesn’t make sense, it’s always for personal interests of some kind, and it’s not always knowable. In Putin’s case, I think his popularity has always risen when he’s invaded other countries. So what makes the most sense to me is he was losing popularity, and this war is meant to boost his numbers, and so far, it has worked. It’s probably going to ultimately backfire, but for now, his approval ratings are way up after this invasion. So it could be as simple as that. Thousands of people dying to bump up one man’s poll numbers.

 

[teepot]

In an earlier post I wondered why the Russians hadn't attacked the weapon trains. Now they have. And then they seem to be having a problem with their own trains. A train with Russian hardware derailed and tore up the track where the engine fell off the tracks. Bad maintenance or sabotage.

 

[afadeev]

I agree with most of your thoughts, but I think Russia is desperate enough to win that they will do something drastic and not just threaten to use certain devices.

Anything is possible. Putin has been anything other than predictable lately.

Per BBC:
https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-61252785

• There has been a "major strategic shift" in the war, with the UK declaring its aim is to clear Russian forces from Ukraine, including Crimea.
• US announcing US$33bn (£26bn) of funding for Ukraine "is an extremely clear signal of intent"
• It also means NATO and the US have decided Vladimir Putin is bluffing about using nuclear weapons if NATO up the ante.

 

[afadeev]

The Austrian [PM or president] went to Moscow a week or so ago and came back reporting that Putin thinks he's winning. I read a comment elsewhere that the reports up the chain of command seem to go:
Lieutenant: "We're under heavy attack, but we might hold"
Captain: "It's bad, but we're holding"
Colonel: "We're holding"
General: "The situation is very promising."
Defense Minister: "Everything is going to plan!"

 

[aerostadt]

I am coming to the conclusion that once Putin makes up his mind, he cannot change. It is an affliction that many politicians have around the world. He might be convinced that he is right, which is another part of having made his mind in his own inflexible way. Being former KGB does not help.

 

[boatgeek]

@georgegassaway had talked about Ukrainian forces using multicopters dropping RPG rounds on armor. The Reddit post linked below shows the system in action. The unit has fins, but the rocket itself doesn't fire. It also looks like the rounds start off horizontal and then fall to vertical.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

One of the military analysts I like best on the various news shows is retired General Mark Hertling who is an analyst on CNN. He seems to have been right about a few things others have missed, he is obviously an expert but can boil things down in an understandable way for non-experts, he’s a good communicator.

He was talking about the current situation along the line of contact in the east. Russians have been making “slow and uneven gains”, and Hertling was describing how that is working.

He said the Russians want to punch a big hole in the defensive line that they can flood through and make larger gains. So their tactic is to focus massive long-range artillery attacks on the defensive positions. Currently the Ukrainians can’t match the Russian artillery fire power. They don’t have the US/NATO supplied 155mm howitzers in play yet, and they don’t have a lot of ammo for their own Russian-style 152mm artillery. So they can’t sustain an artillery duel, and they are forced to pull back their own long-range guns.

When the Russians see the Ukrainians pull back their artillery, they send in their tanks and mechanized infantry to probe for a hole, and the Ukrainian infantry slaughters them with the MANPADS and drones like they did in the north. So they pull back their armor and try again with the artillery. It’s slow and grinding.

He said that this is buying time to get the upgraded artillery up to speed, and once it’s online, the dynamic could change in the Ukrainians’ favor.

I heard a similar assessment from a Ukrainian journalist in contact with friends and sources on the front lines. The Russians are making progress, but it’s slow. He said his sources expect the Ukrainians to counter attack as soon as they have their own armor and upgraded artillery in position and ready. And he said they feel that will be in approximately a week. Maybe in time for Russia’s Victory Day?

One of the frustrating things right now for people wanting to follow the war is that there are not a lot of journalists where the fighting is going on now. The bulk of the journalists are near Kyiv, where things are getting back to normal, but some of the most intense fighting of the entire war is happening right now. So there’s a disconnect between what is happening on the ground and what we see on TV.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

@georgegassaway had talked about Ukrainian forces using multicopters dropping RPG rounds on armor. The Reddit post linked below shows the system in action. The unit has fins, but the rocket itself doesn't fire. It also looks like the rounds start off horizontal and then fall to vertical.

This is awesome.

 

[smstachwick]

One of the military analysts I like best on the various news shows is retired General Mark Hertling who is an analyst on CNN. He seems to have been right about a few things others have missed, he is obviously an expert but can boil things down in an understandable way for non-experts, he’s a good communicator.

He was talking about the current situation along the line of contact in the east. Russians have been making “slow and uneven gains”, and Hertling was describing how that is working.

He said the Russians want to punch a big hole in the defensive line that they can flood through and make larger gains. So their tactic is to focus massive long-range artillery attacks on the defensive positions. Currently the Ukrainians can’t match the Russian artillery fire power. They don’t have the US/NATO supplied 155mm howitzers in play yet, and they don’t have a lot of ammo for their own Russian-style 152mm artillery. So they can’t sustain an artillery duel, and they are forced to pull back their own long-range guns.

When the Russians see the Ukrainians pull back their artillery, they send in their tanks and mechanized infantry to probe for a hole, and the Ukrainian infantry slaughters them with the MANPADS and drones like they did in the north. So they pull back their armor and try again with the artillery. It’s slow and grinding.

He said that this is buying time to get the upgraded artillery up to speed, and once it’s online, the dynamic could change in the Ukrainians’ favor.

I heard a similar assessment from a Ukrainian journalist in contact with friends and sources on the front lines. The Russians are making progress, but it’s slow. He said his sources expect the Ukrainians to counter attack as soon as they have their own armor and upgraded artillery in position and ready. And he said they feel that will be in approximately a week. Maybe in time for Russia’s Victory Day?

One of the frustrating things right now for people wanting to follow the war is that there are not a lot of journalists where the fighting is going on now. The bulk of the journalists are near Kyiv, where things are getting back to normal, but some of the most intense fighting of the entire war is happening right now. So there’s a disconnect between what is happening on the ground and what we see on TV.

Once again proving that the Russians can’t do combined arms. Artillery and armor must be coordinated and mutually supportive to break entrenched defensive lines.

 

[afadeev]

Amazing scenes in Moscow yesterday show exactly why Russia's invasion of Ukraine looks like it was planned by "absolute morons"

 

[Dotini]

One of the military analysts I like best on the various news shows is retired General Mark Hertling who is an analyst on CNN. He seems to have been right about a few things others have missed, he is obviously an expert but can boil things down in an understandable way for non-experts, he’s a good communicator.

He was talking about the current situation along the line of contact in the east. Russians have been making “slow and uneven gains”, and Hertling was describing how that is working.

He said the Russians want to punch a big hole in the defensive line that they can flood through and make larger gains. So their tactic is to focus massive long-range artillery attacks on the defensive positions. Currently the Ukrainians can’t match the Russian artillery fire power. They don’t have the US/NATO supplied 155mm howitzers in play yet, and they don’t have a lot of ammo for their own Russian-style 152mm artillery. So they can’t sustain an artillery duel, and they are forced to pull back their own long-range guns.

When the Russians see the Ukrainians pull back their artillery, they send in their tanks and mechanized infantry to probe for a hole, and the Ukrainian infantry slaughters them with the MANPADS and drones like they did in the north. So they pull back their armor and try again with the artillery. It’s slow and grinding.

He said that this is buying time to get the upgraded artillery up to speed, and once it’s online, the dynamic could change in the Ukrainians’ favor.

I heard a similar assessment from a Ukrainian journalist in contact with friends and sources on the front lines. The Russians are making progress, but it’s slow. He said his sources expect the Ukrainians to counter attack as soon as they have their own armor and upgraded artillery in position and ready. And he said they feel that will be in approximately a week. Maybe in time for Russia’s Victory Day?

One of the frustrating things right now for people wanting to follow the war is that there are not a lot of journalists where the fighting is going on now. The bulk of the journalists are near Kyiv, where things are getting back to normal, but some of the most intense fighting of the entire war is happening right now. So there’s a disconnect between what is happening on the ground and what we see on TV.

A few weeks ago I was watching some other retired general on CNN, and he was saying the Russian plan was not to directly attack the sophisticated and very well-manned interlocking Ukrainian trench system head-on, but to first encircle them. He said the Russians would try for a pincer movement centered on the railhead at Krematorsk.

 

[Sooner Boomer]