North Korean Nukes, FOBS, and EMP attack

The Rocketry Forum

Help Support The Rocketry Forum:

This site may earn a commission from merchant affiliate links, including eBay, Amazon, and others.
[video=youtube;tn_rZMJ42hc]https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=10&v=tn_rZMJ42hc[/video]
 
Is it a mystery cruise missile? Some kind of Kim-Buster? Looks like the wings did not fully open.
 
Yeah, looks right. Odd kind of missile. South Koreans must have got a hold of some. Must be cheaper than the Tomahawk.

taurus.jpg
 
Totally disagree with the typical click-bait title, but the same point is made about countermeasures:

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/09/no-we-cannot-shoot-down-north-koreas-missiles/141070/

The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Threat to the United States noted that any country capable of testing a long-range ballistic missile would “rely initially on readily available technology – including separating RVs [reentry vehicles], spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys – to develop penetration aids and countermeasures.”

Our anti-missile systems have never been realistically tested against any of these simple countermeasures. This is one reason that the Pentagon’s current director of operational testing is much more cautious in his assessments than missile defense program officials. “GMD has demonstrate a limited capability to defend the U.S. Homeland from small numbers of simple intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea or Iran,” he reports. Moreover, it is impossible, he says, to “quantitatively assess GMD performance due to lack of ground tests” and “the reliability and availability of the operational GBI’s [Ground-Based Interceptors] is low, and the MDA continues to discover new failure modes during testing.”


2016 BMD report

https://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/bmds/2016gmd.pdf

Anyway, the bottom line about all this is that in the end, Kim knows any use of his missiles or nukes is equivalent to his suicide. MAD works as a deterrent now just as well as it did during Cold War v1 and, now, during our "new and improved" Cold War v2 with the Ruskies.
 
A range of 500 km is more than enough when your enemy lives next door.
 
Luckily, NK currently has only ONE puny 5MWe reactor operational which is capable of producing only 6kg of Pu239 per year (with approx. 8kg required for each bomb according to the IAEA). That reactor was deactivated in 1994 as part of an agreement, but it was announced to have been reactivated in 2003, deactivated according to agreement againt in 2007. They had an estimated stock of 5 to 6 warheads worth of Pu239 when that second deactivation took place. The reactor started again in 2013 according to satellite imagery.:

[video=youtube;aGPdasS_-X8]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGPdasS_-X8[/video]
 
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/duck-and-cover/

As North Korea knows, and as previously noted (Link), the Japanese and the United States do not have a ballistic missile defense capability deployed and operational today to intercept and negate ballistic missile flights over Japan. All the systems deployed today in and around Japan both Japanese and American intercept and are positioned in the terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight in space and inside the earth’s atmosphere. The North Korean Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, and upcoming KN-08 ballistic missiles can and do overfly these Japanese and American missile defense capabilities deployed today in defense of Japan, when they fly over the territory.

Development of an early assent missile defense capability for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships was attempted, using faster interceptors like as the proposed and promised SM-3 Block IIB for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) phase four that was to intercept Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania to defend the United States of America with a first shot opportunity, but was ultimately canceled by the previous administration in 2013 (Link). From Aegis BMD ships positioned correctly in the Sea of Japan, this much larger interceptor would have been capable of chasing down and intercepting a North Korean missile in the early assent phase. Today there remains inherent capability in the Aegis BMD system for ascent phase intercept, but it has been deemed operationally unfeasible with the speed of the current SM-3 interceptors and the required positioning of the ship in North Korean waters. The Aegis BMD ships are much more valuable defending Japan with their terminal phase defense capabilities and providing key sensor discrimination of the North Korean ballistic missiles targeting the United States of America.

The development of boost phase and early assent missile defense is essential to providing the most efficient means to negate ballistic missiles before the payloads are released. Today, the United States has directed energy solid-state (non-chemical) lasers that can burn through a half inch of steel six miles away in under two seconds with a low yield 30-kilowatt laser. There are solid state lasers today being developed, but not yet programs of record for the Department of Defense, that have 150-kilowatt solid-state power and weigh under 5,000lbs that can be put on reapers and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that can stand off in international waters and burn through any North Korean ballistic missile material during its boost phase in under a second. This capability is a technology game changer and this technology needs to be developed, tested, and made into programs of record for the United States Department of Defense. Having an unmanned capability that can loiter in international airspace with the capability to intercept in the boost phase at speed of light is where North Korea is driving the United States and Japan to go in order to defend their people the best that they can.
 
This article implies too much of a one-way direction of information from NK to Iran. I expect it's more likely a two way communication of tech materials.

Iran's New Ballistic Missile Looks a Lot Like a Modified North Korean One

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...-looks-a-lot-like-a-modified-north-korean-one

Excerpts:

Observers were quick to point out that the missile shares a number of similarities, especially in its apparent engine configuration, with the North Korean BM-25 Musudan, also known as the Hwasong-10.

Iran claims that the new missile is an entirely domestic effort, but it makes similar statements about almost every weapon system it unveils, even those that are clearly derived from foreign designs. Its existing Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missiles are a known derivative of North Korea’s earlier Hwasong-7.

We cannot say conclusively that Iran and North Korea are actively working together on ballistic missile developments, but the timelines and past precedents heavily point to continued cooperation on advanced weapons.

The added fear, of course, would be that if the two are working on missiles, then they could just as easily be sharing information on nuclear weapons.
( Could North Korea help Iran develop nuclear weapons? September 14, 2017 https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/politics/north-korea-iran-nuclear-weapons-program/index.html )
 
The added fear, of course, would be that if the two are working on missiles, then they could just as easily be sharing information on nuclear weapons.[/I] ( Could North Korea help Iran develop nuclear weapons? September 14, 2017 https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/politics/north-korea-iran-nuclear-weapons-program/index.html )

Far from simply being a fear, this should be a fundamental assumption. Iran has hundreds of billions of dollars IN CASH from the good old US of A but has a treaty (whether they follow it or not is arguable) that says they cannot purify uranium. NK has proven, tested, nukes but is starving for hard currency. That these two are working together, and are known to exchange technology development, makes it a tiny leap to believe that NK would be more than happy to sell Iran some nukes. And while NK may not be able to deliver a nuke at long range, Iran can reach all kinds of important Western targets with short and intermediate range missles. Heck, they could smuggle them across borders in the back of a truck or in the belly of a tanker ship. This line of thinking, while totally reasonable, is far more frightening than NK blustering about nuking Guam.
 
Far from simply being a fear, this should be a fundamental assumption. Iran has hundreds of billions of dollars IN CASH from the good old US of A but has a treaty (whether they follow it or not is arguable) that says they cannot purify uranium. NK has proven, tested, nukes but is starving for hard currency. That these two are working together, and are known to exchange technology development, makes it a tiny leap to believe that NK would be more than happy to sell Iran some nukes. And while NK may not be able to deliver a nuke at long range, Iran can reach all kinds of important Western targets with short and intermediate range missles. Heck, they could smuggle them across borders in the back of a truck or in the belly of a tanker ship. This line of thinking, while totally reasonable, is far more frightening than NK blustering about nuking Guam.
Yep, that's exactly the way I read the situation, too.
 
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/duck-and-cover/

As North Korea knows, and as previously noted (Link), the Japanese and the United States do not have a ballistic missile defense capability deployed and operational today to intercept and negate ballistic missile flights over Japan. All the systems deployed today in and around Japan both Japanese and American intercept and are positioned in the terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight in space and inside the earth’s atmosphere. The North Korean Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, and upcoming KN-08 ballistic missiles can and do overfly these Japanese and American missile defense capabilities deployed today in defense of Japan, when they fly over the territory.

Development of an early assent missile defense capability for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships was attempted, using faster interceptors like as the proposed and promised SM-3 Block IIB for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) phase four that was to intercept Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania to defend the United States of America with a first shot opportunity, but was ultimately canceled by the previous administration in 2013 (Link). From Aegis BMD ships positioned correctly in the Sea of Japan, this much larger interceptor would have been capable of chasing down and intercepting a North Korean missile in the early assent phase. Today there remains inherent capability in the Aegis BMD system for ascent phase intercept, but it has been deemed operationally unfeasible with the speed of the current SM-3 interceptors and the required positioning of the ship in North Korean waters. The Aegis BMD ships are much more valuable defending Japan with their terminal phase defense capabilities and providing key sensor discrimination of the North Korean ballistic missiles targeting the United States of America.

The development of boost phase and early assent missile defense is essential to providing the most efficient means to negate ballistic missiles before the payloads are released. Today, the United States has directed energy solid-state (non-chemical) lasers that can burn through a half inch of steel six miles away in under two seconds with a low yield 30-kilowatt laser. There are solid state lasers today being developed, but not yet programs of record for the Department of Defense, that have 150-kilowatt solid-state power and weigh under 5,000lbs that can be put on reapers and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that can stand off in international waters and burn through any North Korean ballistic missile material during its boost phase in under a second. This capability is a technology game changer and this technology needs to be developed, tested, and made into programs of record for the United States Department of Defense. Having an unmanned capability that can loiter in international airspace with the capability to intercept in the boost phase at speed of light is where North Korea is driving the United States and Japan to go in order to defend their people the best that they can.

Weren't the 747 laser systems mothballed? Or perhaps the systems were further miniaturized? Kurt
 
Weren't the 747 laser systems mothballed? Or perhaps the systems were further miniaturized? Kurt
I think they were, a few years back. I have read of a laser that is being worked on in the 100kW power class. Solid-state Diode-pumped YAG I seem to recall. Relatively portable compared to the old excimer in the 747.
 
Weren't the 747 laser systems mothballed? Or perhaps the systems were further miniaturized? Kurt
Yep, that system was. The standoff range was not adequate and since it was a chemical laser it was a potential flying bomb even if not hit by enemy fire.

Boeing YAL-1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_YAL-1

I see bragging by military companies producing laser weapons shown in YouTube videos, but the truth is that they aren't worth much for anything other than shooting down small drones, mortar rounds and artillery shells in very range-limited point defense:

Iron Beam

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Beam

The utility of directed energy for missile boost-phase interception will only occur with orders of magnitude increases in power and refined methods to compensate for beam spread and diversion due to distorting atmospheric effects. Even then, countermeasures are possible. I recall seeing somewhere on-line some examples: ablative skin and missile roll, laminar flow "smoke" layer over skin, etc. I suspect small kinetic kill vehicle swarms launched by ground based ABMs will be possible for exoatmospheric intercepts of warheads along with any decoys undetectable as such before the necessary laser power increase is achieved to overcome all of the boost-phase obstacles to success.
 
This system would require continuous loitering for defensive use against a surprise attack, something which could be both expensive depending upon the number required and provocative. It would be more useful to suppress retaliation after our first strike. Also, while a high altitude stealth drone will probably be used, once it fires its laser, it's given away its position.

What Drone Will Lockheed Use For Its High-Flying Ballistic Missile Frying Laser Demo?
The high-altitude unmanned test aircraft will supposedly lead to an operational system used to destroy ballistic missiles during their boost phase.
BY TYLER ROGOWAY - OCTOBER 11, 2017

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...gh-flying-ballistic-missile-frying-laser-demo

Last June, we talked in depth about the Missile Defense Agency's initiative to field an "Airborne Laser 2.0" of sorts that can shoot down enemy ballistic missiles during their vulnerable boost phase. But this time, instead of massive 747 carrying a chemical laser system, this new program looks to mount a much smaller solid state laser on a high altitude, long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft that can fly nearly at U-2 altitudes, above 65,000 feet, and loiter for 36 hours at a time.

Lockheed Martin won the latest contract that is part of this initiative to provide what is being called the Low Power Laser Demonstrator (LPLD). This system seeks to first test a low power laser system on a high-flying unmanned aircraft capable of tracking and engaging ballistic missiles during their boost phase. Integrating a high power laser system will come in a follow on phase to the overall program.

A major part of phase one of this program will be to show how a system can fire a laser over long range without turbulence and atmospheric dispersion weakening the beam's focused energy of its target. Using a high-altitude platform goes a long way in attenuating these issues as the atmosphere is far thinner than at the typical altitudes airliners and especially most unmanned vehicles fly at. Also, the air is smoother at high altitudes and flying above the weather means clouds and water particles aren't likely to interfere with a boost phase engagement. Finally, the higher an aircraft flies the farther many of its sensors and terrestrial communications can reach due enhanced line of sight.


Missile Defense Agency Seeking A High-Flying Drone For "Airborne Laser 2.0"
You can think of the defunct YAL-1 as the "analogue" version of the Airborne Laser concept, with an unmanned high-flying drone sporting a solid state laser being the digital version.
BY TYLER ROGOWAY - JUNE 14, 2017

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...-for-high-flying-drone-for-airborne-laser-2-0

The YAL-1 used a huge, complex, fuel-hungry chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) to do its missile murdering business. The size of a 747-400 was required to house the huge complex system and all its chemicals, and even then the YAL-1 could only provide about 20 full power shots on a single sortie. Operationally, there were issues as well. A fleet of AL-1s would have been extremely expensive to procure and operate. Especially when providing continuous coverage of an enemy area. Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who was adamant about cancelling the YAL-1 program, said that a fleet 10 to 20 AL-1s, would cost a billion and a half dollars apiece, and each would demand $100 million a year to operate. Gates concluded before the budget axe fell on the program that "there's nobody in uniform that I know who believes that this is a workable concept."

Even if such a AL-1 force was fielded, enemy countries could just move their ballistic missiles beyond the relatively short range of the AL-1's laser. Also, it was pretty clear how to defeat such a system overall. Just shooting down the Airborne Laser before a surprise launch would negate its capability entirely, and a 747 flying continuous figure-eight patters along an enemy's border is not a hard to target to acquire to say the least. As such, operational AL-1s would have required constant fighter coverage and electronic jamming and even suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) support. The whole concept was simply unrealistic, but using a flying laser of some type to solve the boost-phase intercept challenge still seemed like the only way to go.

Between the YAL-1's short life and today there have been major leaps in directed energy. Much smaller and lighter solid-state laser technologies that use electricity instead of chemicals for energy are all the rage in the defense worlds.

These two technologies, specifically high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft and solid state lasers, are what the Missile Defense Agency wants to combine into a Airborne Laser 2.0 of sorts—a networked system capable of loitering very high over or near enemy airspace, ready to knock down theatre ballistic missiles, and possibly even fast-flying ICBMs, during their most vulnerable phase of the flight. This of course is the missile's boost phase, when it ascends at its lowest flying speeds atop a bright plume of hot gas.
 
One note---A stealth drone would not likely give away it's position. The laser is not in the visible light range. They would know it's there in a big sky but not where. It's also a good bet that you would have more than one on station at any given point in time. I'm also willing to bet that 65,000 ft is a sort of minimum.--H
 
One note---A stealth drone would not likely give away it's position. The laser is not in the visible light range. They would know it's there in a big sky but not where. It's also a good bet that you would have more than one on station at any given point in time. I'm also willing to bet that 65,000 ft is a sort of minimum.--H
IR observables are part of stealth. A high powered laser beam would create plenty of it along its path as well as beam atmospheric scattering at the wavelength of the laser which would also be detectable, not by the naked eye, just by appropriate sensors, causing the same problem as a missile contrail, a reason for the use of low-smoke propellants. Once the position of the stealth aircraft is known and considering that the stealth drones we know of being developed aren't high-performance or highly maneuverable in a fighter aircraft sense, knowing where it's at allows a missile to be rapidly sent close enough to it that radar acquisition of it by the missile might be possible. However, granted, electronic countermeasures by the drone can still do their thing and those countermeasures are likely to be more effective with very low aircraft radar cross-sections as would be the case with a smallish stealth drone.
 
Dear Reader: The Unauthorized Autobiography of Kim Jong Il (funny, but true info)

https://www.amazon.com/dp/1495283259/?tag=skimlinks_replacement-20

[video=youtube;d2EBUE4BfQU]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2EBUE4BfQU[/video]

"People are so used to thinking of North Korea as bonkers and they are bonkers in a sense but they're not bonkers in the sense that they're unpredictable. They very much have a clear coherent philosophy which most Western people do not have an understanding of including people in the media which is unfortunate. So, part of what I had put forward this book is once you read it you will understand why they do what they do and it kind of reads like a murder mystery. We know who the victims are - the North Korean people. We know where the perpetrators are and now you find out their motive and their means and how they took this proud country and just drove it into the ground into the least free state on earth."
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Experts have warned Congress that it is ignoring a newly-developed weapon from North Korea which could shut down the US power grid and kill the vast majority of Americans within a year.

Two members of the disbanded congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) commission said at a recent House Homeland Security subcommittee hearing that a nuclear EMP attack from Kim Jong Un was the “biggest threat” to the US yet it remains “unacknowledged” by the government.

More attention has been focused on the regime’s continued testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles this year, but the dictatorship also recently claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb underground in September.

The two former commission members added that North Korea is now thought to have 60 nuclear weapons.

The regime is developing H-bombs which are “comparable to sophisticated US two-stage thermonuclear weapons”, they said.

The EMP commission was defunded under the new administration.

House Homeland Security subcommittee hearing
North Korea Nuclear EMP Attack: An Existential Threat
October 12, 2017


https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM09/20171012/106467/HHRG-115-HM09-Wstate-PryP-20171012.pdf

NK-warheads.jpg
 
Personally, I don't think this will happen for a number of reasons including the sort of any additional data about their device which might be possible to determine by remote monitoring of an above-ground test, but maybe they won't care and the propaganda gained is more important to them.

North Korea May Test A Nuke In Pacific Because Their Underground Site Is Crumbling
Some scientists even worry more testing could cause an eruption of the massive Mount Paektu volcano nearby
BY TYLER ROGOWAY - OCTOBER 16, 2017

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...c-because-their-underground-site-is-crumbling
 
Hmmmm, hadn't thought of this one and it's just as dangerous of an asymmetrical attack as an EMP one, but even easier to carry out:

Just Remember North Korea Can Destroy Low Earth Orbit For Everyone On A Whim
Kim Jong Un could use his ballistic missiles to create clouds of orbital debris, destroying US and allied military satellites and much, much more.
BY TYLER ROGOWAY - OCTOBER 18, 2017

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...estroy-low-earth-orbit-for-everyone-on-a-whim

Excerpts:

Low earth orbit (LEO), which is a band of space measuring from roughly 100 miles to 1,200 miles above the earth, has become one part packed parking lot and one part junkyard within just 60 years of mankind having access to space. Everything from communications satellites to spy satellites to the International Space Station call low earth orbit home. Simply put, the vast majority of all satellites are stationed there and many of them are critical to our very way of life. This makes the reality that North Korea could destroy accessibility to this vital medium without warning very disturbing.

The amount of debris in LEO is already a major problem. Just a tiny piece of space junk traveling at thousands of miles per hour can cause catastrophic damage to operational satellites and even the International Space Station. With over 500,000 trackable pieces of space junk (generally larger than a marble in size) and millions of smaller ones whizzing around the planet, the problem has become a major one, but it could get much, much worse.

Case in point, an anti-satellite weapons test executed by China in 2007 that used a defunct Chinese weather satellite as a target. The satellite was stationed in a polar orbit at 537 miles altitude. A kinetic kill vehicle launched by a modified DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile smashed into the satellite at a combined closure rate of five miles a second. Over 3,500 pieces of trackable space debris were caused by the test—the biggest single release of orbital space debris in history. It is estimated that over 150,000 smaller particles were also released after the kill vehicle shattered the satellite, many of which will remain in orbit for centuries to come.

Just because potential high-end foes of the US and the US itself are developing softer, kinder, anti-satellite capabilities, with an unspoken mutually assured destruction strategy of sorts making kinetic kill anti-satellite weapons undesirable, it doesn't mean other countries that don't have a large stake in space are following suit. Quite the opposite in fact, they have made note of a potential highly asymmetric weapons capability—one that they most likely already have in their arsenal.

A rogue state, namely North Korea, who has to find ways to neutralize American, South Korean, and Japanese technological superiority any way they can, know full well that they can deny easy access to LEO and destroy many strategic satellites in the process by leveraging their existing ballistic missile technology.

We are not talking about developing a hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapon that rides atop a ballistic missile here. Instead the goal would be to detonate a number of ballistic missiles at varying orbital altitudes and latitudes, with their payload being thousands of ballbearings or other shrapnel items. Instead of being fired on long down-range lofted trajectories, they would be launched at steeper parabolic flight profiles—similar to how North Korea tests its missiles today. (I don't agree with his preferred launch trajectory claim. One would want an orbital destination trajectory. Shrapnel in a steep parabolic trajectory would simply fall back to earth and the odds of it hitting anything during that trip are tiny whereas in orbit they'd have far more opportunities to collide with something. - W)

With a handful of missiles launched into popular orbital pathways and detonated could result in much of the current utility that space offers being destroyed. What's most worrisome is that this application doesn't require complex reentry vehicles or ground targeting and navigation capabilities like a long-range ballistic missile-bound nuclear warhead does. Instead it turns a ballistic missile into the ultimate anti-access/area denial weapon—that area being the closest vicinity of orbital space.

The fact that North Korea has made massive strides in ballistic missile technology over the last year makes all this much more concerning. Their Hwasong-14 (HS-14) ICBM reached a peak altitude of 2,300 miles during its last test in late July. That is nearly ten times the height of the International Space Station's orbit. With height being sacrificed for payload and flight profile, HS-14 missiles could put massive amounts of debris in orbit throughout the LEO envelope.

The chances of North Korea carrying out such a devastating asymmetric attack would become increasingly more likely as a conflict approaches or gets underway and it should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis of everyone in a strategic decision making position from the Commander in Chief on down the line. Beyond the military reasoning for launching such an attack, by most indications the Kim regime would follow a "scorched earth" mentality if an attempt is made at removing it from power, and taking low earth orbit away from humanity could be part of such a plan.
 
Back
Top