Quest for a Next-Gen A-10 Warthog

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Winston

Lorenzo von Matterhorn
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https://warisboring.com/articles/what-will-the-next-a-10-warthog-look-like/

On Feb. 2, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced the Air Force would delay the A-10’s retirement until at least 2022.

Former Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II squadron commander and current U.S. congresswoman Martha McSally is calling on the Pentagon to budget for a next-generation replacement for the venerable jet affectionately known as the Warthog.

“The U.S. Air Force needs a next-generation A-10 before attempting to mothball any further A-10s. The specific mission set for CAS/FAC-A/CSAR requires a specific aircraft, not one that is a jack-of-all-trades but a master of none...

There are times, and there will be future times, where you must provide very close air support to the troops on the ground who are often on the run or unable to provide coordinates. I have flown CAS missions in these conditions where the pilot must visually identify friendly forces and enemy combatants to hit the target and avoid fratricide. You cannot stand off in all CAS scenarios, even in the future."
 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/official-us-air-force-no-143602496.html

On Wednesday (Aug 24, 2016), the Government Accountability Office released a scathing report about the US Air Force's half-baked plan to replace the A-10, essentially concluding that the Air Force had no good end game in sight.

"The Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force do not have quality information on the full implications of A-10 divestment, including gaps that could be created by A-10 divestment and mitigation options," the report from GAO, a nonpartisan entity, states.

The A-10, a relic of the Cold War-era, flies cheap, effective sorties and is well suited to most of the US's current operations. But surprisingly, it's not really the plane itself that's indispensable to the Air Force — it's the community.

Ground forces know A-10 pilots as undisputed kings of close air support, which is especially useful in today's combat zones where ground troops often don't have an artillery presence on the ground.

But there are other planes for close air support when it comes down to it. The B-1 Lancer has superior loiter time and bomb capacity compared to the A-10, but it turns out, close air support is only one area where the A-10s excel.

The report finds that A-10 pilots undergo many times more close air support, search and rescue, and forward air control training than any other community of pilots in the force.

While the Air Force seems determined to replace this community, and reallocate their resources elsewhere, the report finds that the cost estimates used to justify the retirement of the A-10 just don't make the grade.

According to the GAO, "a reliable cost estimate is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible."

The report finds that the Air Force's cost estimates for replacing the A-10 are almost comprehensive, minimally documented, and just plain not credible.

Indeed we have seen some pivots on the Air Force's official position on the A-10. At one point, they wanted to retire it stating that the F-35 would take over those capabilities, but then the Senate told them to prove it.

More recently, we heard that the Air Force wants to replace the A-10 with not one, but two new planes, one of which would be developed specifically for the role.

What the GAO recommends, however, is that the Air Force come up with a better, more concrete plan to mitigate the losses in capability caused by the A-10's mothballing.

Lawmakers were not shy about the relief the report brought to the complicated question. Perhaps the best testimony came from Congresswoman Martha McSally, a former A-10 pilot herself:

"Today's report confirms what I've argued continuously — the Air Force's flawed and shifting plan to prematurely retire the A-10 is dangerous and would put lives in danger... I've fought for and won full funding for our entire A-10 fleet and to make the retirement of any A-10 condition-based, not-time based."


------

The report:

https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679205.pdf
 
The A-10 is a unique platform. It's a proven offensive and defensive performer.
IMHO, a new version should be in works with little changes other than electronics.
It's low n slow flight capabilities with it's payload and cannon, it's hard to beat in mountainous and canyon terrains.
And it's signature sound raises the hair on the back of your neck.
 
The A-10 is a unique platform. It's a proven offensive and defensive performer.
IMHO, a new version should be in works with little changes other than electronics.
It's low n slow flight capabilities with it's payload and cannon, it's hard to beat in mountainous and canyon terrains.
And it's signature sound raises the hair on the back of your neck.

Agree with all of that, but in the moden battlespace, with current-gen ground to air missiles, both the man portables and the others, plus the radar controlled AA guns, the A-10 is pretty vulnerable. Loss rates were pretty high in Desert Storm.

Get rid of those threats and the A-10 owns the low level battlespace. Might have to team them with improved Wild Weasles or a future capable equivalent that could support the A-10s with intense SEAD activity. That and improved spoofing of IR manpad missiles by the A-10 could help keep the A-10 viable in modern warfare.
 
Agree with all of that, but in the moden battlespace, with current-gen ground to air missiles, both the man portables and the others, plus the radar controlled AA guns, the A-10 is pretty vulnerable. Loss rates were pretty high in Desert Storm.

Get rid of those threats and the A-10 owns the low level battlespace. Might have to team them with improved Wild Weasles or a future capable equivalent that could support the A-10s with intense SEAD activity. That and improved spoofing of IR manpad missiles by the A-10 could help keep the A-10 viable in modern warfare.

A-10s flew 8640 sorties in Desert Storm, 6 A-10s were lost to IR SAMS, 3 were damaged by SAMS, and 11 Damaged by AAA, none were lost to Radar type SAMS, so a total of 20 aircraft casualties (I don't have numbers for how many of the damaged A-10s were unable to be returned to operations). All the lost A-10s were destroyed during daylight hours, and their dark green european theatre paint scheme was believed to be part of the reason some were lost as it made them easy to see against the sand and sky, some units even repainted their aircraft light gray similar to other AirForce aircraft buy they were ordered to repaint them in the original dark green color again by CENTAF.

Given a more technologically advanced foe (like China or Russia) we would probably loose more A-10s. The data I was quoting from above stated that 71 percent of ALL aircraft losses to man portable sams was from the SA-7.
 
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The A-10 used to be stationed near me at England Air Park. They were a common sight for me growing up. I will always remember the signature whine/roar of those two engines. Still see them, just not as often. They are an amazing platform to be sure. Will be hard pressed to find a suitable replacement.

Depending on the reports you read, around six or seven A-10s were lost in Desert Storm. And two of those were on landing after being hit by enemy fire. So four or five were shot down, and they are low and slow. Three f-16s were lost and two f-15s, nothing low and slow about them. A-10s make up around 14 to 21 percent of combat losses in Desert Storm, again, depending on the reports. I don't think there has been any A-10 brought down by a man portable however.
 
The A-10 used to be stationed near me at England Air Park. They were a common sight for me growing up. I will always remember the signature whine/roar of those two engines. Still see them, just not as often. They are an amazing platform to be sure. Will be hard pressed to find a suitable replacement.

Depending on the reports you read, around six or seven A-10s were lost in Desert Storm. And two of those were on landing after being hit by enemy fire. So four or five were shot down, and they are low and slow. Three f-16s were lost and two f-15s, nothing low and slow about them. A-10s make up around 14 to 21 percent of combat losses in Desert Storm, again, depending on the reports. I don't think there has been any A-10 brought down by a man portable however.

I think there were 6 A-10s taken out, all but one (AAA) by SA-9 or SA-13. Does not matter if it crashed after landing or where it was attacked. still a combat loss. Three others were damaged by SAMs and no less than 11 were damaged by AAA.

Compare the actual numbers of A-10s deployed to numbers of other aircraft deployed and the loss and amage rate is higher than it appears.
 
That the loss rate is higher for A-10's than other combat aircraft, particularly in an environment where the enemy is not a significant air to air combat threat, is not at all surprising. Further, that the loss rate for combat ground support aircraft is higher than other aircraft, in any environment should probably not be surprising. A better question wound be, how did the A-10 loss rate compare to all other aircraft that were actively participating in close combat support (such as Cobra and Apache gunships).

In the end, this is *the* fundamental problem.

The Air Force is, and always has been, uncomfortable with close combat air support but the guys on the ground need it, and appreciate it far more than anything else. The Air Force is compelled to statistically compare the A-10 to its other aircraft because that's all it knows. Rotary wing aircraft, like gunships, are not a part of the Air Force world. They belong to the Army and the Marines. As a result, the Air Force is always comparing apples to oranges in every possible way for an aircraft that performs a mission that they don't really want to begin with. Typically, the strongest support and lobbying in favor of the A-10 has come from the Army and the Marine Corps who recognize the value that the aircraft has to *them*.

The answer would seem to be that the A-10's, their eventual successors, and all close combat air support as a general mission (which is not to say that F-16's, F-14's, etc. would never be called upon to perform such duties) should be transferred to the Army and Marine Corps.
 
The answer would seem to be that the A-10's, their eventual successors, and all close combat air support as a general mission (which is not to say that F-16's, F-14's, etc. would never be called upon to perform such duties) should be transferred to the Army and Marine Corps.
Totally agree.

Funny thing is, according to an excellent documentary I've seen, the A-10 was the end result of the Army's AH-56 Cheyenne program. DoD funding was limited, so the USAF developed a fixed wing close air support aircraft to get funding for that role taken from the Army. The USAF didn't want the other service encroaching on its turf.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_AH-56_Cheyenne#Program_demise

In 1971, political friction increased between the Army and the Air Force over the close air support (CAS) mission. The Air Force asserted that the Cheyenne would infringe on the Air Force's CAS mission in support of the Army, which had been mandated with the Key West Agreement of 1948.

In April 1972, the Senate published its report on CAS. The report recommended funding of the Air Force's A-X program, which would become the A-10 Thunderbolt II, and limited procurement of the Harrier for the Marine Corps. The report never referred to the Cheyenne by name and only offered a lukewarm recommendation for the Army to continue procurement of attack helicopters, so long as their survivability could be improved.
 
Table 205 from the Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993. Source: Air Force Historical Support Division

Screen-Shot-2015-10-25-at-3.51.18-PM.jpg
 
You'll notice from the table, most of the aircraft lost were used in the ground attack role. That's to be expected and it's a testament to the A-10's ruggedness that more were not lost at almost 8000 sorties although a good number of these were Scud hunts. The high loss rate of the Tornado was a function of the particular mission it was tasked with early on which was runway denial. Most of the weapon systems developed in the late 60's and 70's were designed around the European theater and the perceived threat and how to control the battle front. The C-5, F-15,F-16, A-10 were all designed to fight against an invading Soviet and Eastern European aggressor. Even the F-14 and F-18 were designed with the Soviet Navy in mind since they were in the middle of their breakout and had developed a blue water Navy. The M-1 Abrams was also designed for the European theater.I'm gonna get a glass of wine and come back and tell you the rest of the story of the AX development I bet you didn't know--H
 
What I'll what tell you is knowledge gained from my father who was program manager for the Lockheed proposal for the AX. CAS was really never a consideration but a by product of the design. The Air Force has never embraced the CAS role. I agree that that role should be handed over to the Marines or Navy. As things stand in the world today--ALL-- the forces should embrace it. Enough about that. The AX, now A-10 was developed to --SLOW DOWN-- an invading Eastern European threat. That's the simple truth. The job was to go out and destroy as many of the invading tanks--which would likely be in the thousands--as possible. While forward basing was designed into the AX, the first few missions would likely be flown from western Europe. What does that mean. Well it has to have a good range but be needs to be refueled at some point or points. That means a relatively big air frame. That big air frame is great for hanging a lot of ordinance on. Remember it had to carry that beautiful 30mm gum , which was huge by any measure if you include the shells it had to carry. The AX with it's large ordinance load was expected to be lost in great numbers but if only a few made it through they could do massive damage to an advancing army. This would give time for the NATO/American forces to group or regroup and attack. It would be a war of attrition. With The AX in front of it all. Remember, we're talking the 70's , so information was much more limited. The SR-71 would be the closest thing the real time information we would have. Let's take a break for a moment---more coming--H
 
So, all the various contractors went about their business to present the to the AF what they wanted. In the end the A-10 was chosen after a fly off and in my opinion they got it right! While the AX was in development at Lockheed, one of the engineers voiced up in a meeting. A lot of studies were done to come up with the right design but the premise of loosing aircraft at an alarming number made no sense. Why don't we talk to the Israelis. After all they have far more experience than us in tank battles.The design continued on it's course and the Lockheed design was similar to the other competitors in the end. It met what the AF wanted but in the end fell short. That might be a result of the study done with the Israelis. The A-10 was not what they needed--ever wonder why they--of all nations--never got any? The Lockheed proposal for the AX was written in total in calligraphy. One of the junior engineers was interested in it as hobby and was tapped on the shoulder to write it up as a snub to the AF .That's how strongly Lockheed felt about the direction of the project.------I'm taking these little breaks because I keep getting kicked off the sight so hang in there--more in a minute--H
 
The Israeli study came up with quite a different aircraft than what we see today. It did not have the range or payload as the A-10 , in fact It was about 1/2 the size.The range problem was a function of assuming we would see thousands of tanks massing on the Eastern front.We would go ahead and forward base the planes. Seems smart to me. There is no need to carry a large load but with a usable load' it's smaller and more survivable. The cost was about 1/3 the A-10. It was a canard with a counter rotating turbo prop with better performance than the A-10 down low where it counted. It had six hard points , two of them committed to Sidewinders on the wing tips for self defense. Here's the really fun stuff. It could take off and land from an unimproved airfield the size of a tennis court!!! They could be bought in numbers to overwhelm the enemy and would be more survivable.The CAS mission was a defined element. Well, the Israelis wanted them--they really wanted them! But the sale was blocked and the AF had no interest in them since they were already committed to the A-10.The point is, the A-10 is a fantastic CAS aircraft but there were designs that would be better that were not bought. The A-10 is the best CAS/Tank buster in the world now by default. There is not anything out there even close at this point in time. To restart the A-10 program would cost as much as a new aircraft. Would an upgraded A-10 be good at the CAS mission? Absolutely! Is that the best choice?
 
You'll notice from the table, most of the aircraft lost were used in the ground attack role. That's to be expected and it's a testament to the A-10's ruggedness that more were not lost at almost 8000 sorties although a good number of these were Scud hunts.

That was my main point in posting it. I didn't know that many sorties were Scud hunts, but that mission makes complete sense.

The high loss rate of the Tornado was a function of the particular mission it was tasked with early on which was runway denial.

I recall reading about that at the time. They covered the very hazardous delivery of this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JP233

I'm gonna get a glass of wine and come back and tell you the rest of the story of the AX development I bet you didn't know--H

That would be fascinating.
 
The A-10 is the best CAS/Tank buster in the world now by default. There is not anything out there even close at this point in time. To restart the A-10 program would cost as much as a new aircraft. Would an upgraded A-10 be good at the CAS mission? Absolutely! Is that the best choice?
I'll let the experts decide and hope they're right. All I know is that the F35 isn't even remotely a replacement for true, low and slow, CAS as the USAF initially claimed but later didn't. I realize that claim was entirely driven by funding issues. I hope someone is very seriously looking into that old Israeli concept you mentioned as they definitely ain't no dummies in military matters, especially with their usual goal of getting maximum value from limited funds.
 
I remember something about this one as a contender for taking on some of the roles. Can fly hours on the same amount of fuel it takes an F-18 to take off. Don't remember where I saw it or heard it.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embraer_EMB_314_Super_Tucano
I've seen an article on that, too. Here's an overview of candidates right now:

https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/03/14/5-Attack-Planes-Could-Replace-10-Warthog

HOWEVER, none of those have what I think are essential characteristics in any modern CAS aircraft:

TREMENDOUS resistance to ground fire through redundancy and ARMOR.

Ilyushin Il-2 - the Soviet's WWII "flying tank" (I own a very popular IL2 flight simulation game)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilyushin_Il-2#.22The_Flying_tank.22

LOW IR SIGNATURE to defeat MAPADS - Turboprop engines would I'D GUESS provide a much lower IR signature than even the A-10s high bypass turbofans placed above its horizontal stabilizer, but is that important considering the availability of cheap multi-spectral IR flares?

Automatic launching of flares via an IR-based MANPAD launch detection system would be essential because MAPADS are ideally launched from behind an aircraft after it has passed. However, missiles are becoming smarter and may be able to ignore flares, so ULTRA low IR signature of the aircraft may eventually be need, if not already.

Second disadvantage of a turboprop - only one of them. Two turbofans on the A-10. Twin engine plane using smaller turboprops? EDIT: placed ABOVE each wing for greater survivability, even lower IR signature, and to allow maximum ordinance stations under each wing.

FLY-BY-CABLE MECHANICAL BACKUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

GEAR UP LANDING SURVIVABILITY - note the main landing gear wheels protruding below their pods on the A-10.

20mm rapid fire cannon with HE projectiles - you can't be that accurate so use what are effectively a bunch of small "grenades."

Undoubtedly a lot more that I'm forgetting right now.

Bottom line - a NEW aircraft is needed since nothing "off the shelf" looks even remotely good enough to me at least.

VERY important for the U.S. - Realize that pilot losses and/or capture are MUCH LESS acceptable these days for political reasons considering the typical conflicts they're involved in and that is a factor that nations like Brazil, the source of the Super Tucano, do not have to concern themselves with one bit since they are not in any way serving the role of "world police force."
 
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So here's a craaazy idea from a non-military, non-aerospace engineer. Why are we considering a single aircraft for all CAS roles? To me, it seems like we basically have two major CAS scenarios: ISIS and a real military. ISIS has lots of light trucks, some number of armored vehicles that they looted from armories, but probably not a whole lot of training in how to use them effectively. This group includes a raft of terrorist organizations up to small nations' militaries. A real military starts at something like Iraq in 2003, where you can expect to get significant return fire and that it is likely to cause losses. Both of these roles are extremely important, but a simple cheap aircraft that can take on ISIS is going to get slaughtered against a real military. Kipling had a line about the cream of the British Empire being killed one by one by Afghans with 20-rupee rifles (sound familiar?). Along those lines, it's completely unsustainable to spend over $30K/hour in flight time to shoot up trucks or use $1M Tomahawks to take out training bases.

Leave the real militaries to the F-35 and other supersonic jets. We would go in with the heavy hitters first to limit casualties anyway. You're not going to try to contest an airspace with a networked SAM system with the slow planes you need for close-in CAS.

So that leaves a major mission open for our simple CAS aircraft. My proposed policy-level design brief is a lot like Winston's. I would prioritize quiet (noise and IR), pilot armor, survivability, and efficiency in roughly that order, with armament skewing toward the cheap like guns or smallish missiles/bombs. My thinking is that if the targets don't know you're there until the guns open up, you're a lot safer, with some backup for the other guy getting the drop on you. If you can make it home on one engine, and they're not so close that a hit on one disables the other, you're better off. If you can hang around in the sky for a while waiting for coordinates, the guys on the ground you're supporting are better off. I dunno if this "spec" means turboprops over the wings or a high-bypass fan or how much armor is enough (definitely .50 cal, but 20mm?). I would want experts to tell me how to do it.

It won't do everything, but neither does an attack helicopter or an AC-130.
 
A few years ago, Scaled Composites built a proof of concept demonstrator for the Army. It was effectively a scaled down A-10. The single engine was mounted on one side and the gun would be on the other. As a proof of concept demonstrator, it was smaller than the actual production plane would be but the design could be up-scaled. It never really gained any traction, in part due to the restrictions on the Army having fixed wing attack aircraft. The ARES did however prove to be difficult to track with AA systems because of it's small size and relatively high speed and maneuverability.--ares.jpg-Rutan-Scaled-ARES-On-Ground-2011.jpg
 
So here's a craaazy idea from a non-military, non-aerospace engineer. Why are we considering a single aircraft for all CAS roles? To me, it seems like we basically have two major CAS scenarios: ISIS and a real military. ISIS has lots of light trucks, some number of armored vehicles that they looted from armories, but probably not a whole lot of training in how to use them effectively. This group includes a raft of terrorist organizations up to small nations' militaries. A real military starts at something like Iraq in 2003, where you can expect to get significant return fire and that it is likely to cause losses. Both of these roles are extremely important, but a simple cheap aircraft that can take on ISIS is going to get slaughtered against a real military. Kipling had a line about the cream of the British Empire being killed one by one by Afghans with 20-rupee rifles (sound familiar?). Along those lines, it's completely unsustainable to spend over $30K/hour in flight time to shoot up trucks or use $1M Tomahawks to take out training bases.

Leave the real militaries to the F-35 and other supersonic jets. We would go in with the heavy hitters first to limit casualties anyway. You're not going to try to contest an airspace with a networked SAM system with the slow planes you need for close-in CAS.

So that leaves a major mission open for our simple CAS aircraft. My proposed policy-level design brief is a lot like Winston's. I would prioritize quiet (noise and IR), pilot armor, survivability, and efficiency in roughly that order, with armament skewing toward the cheap like guns or smallish missiles/bombs. My thinking is that if the targets don't know you're there until the guns open up, you're a lot safer, with some backup for the other guy getting the drop on you. If you can make it home on one engine, and they're not so close that a hit on one disables the other, you're better off. If you can hang around in the sky for a while waiting for coordinates, the guys on the ground you're supporting are better off. I dunno if this "spec" means turboprops over the wings or a high-bypass fan or how much armor is enough (definitely .50 cal, but 20mm?). I would want experts to tell me how to do it.

It won't do everything, but neither does an attack helicopter or an AC-130.
Yep, that's agrees with my point and the unsaid answer to the question hornet driver posed.

The A-10 is currently being used for COIN (counterinsurgency) functions and that mission is what needs to be replaced with a new aircraft.

Anti-tank and anti-vehicle efforts against a more sophisticated adversary WOULD be carried out using smart, guided weapons from fast, stealthly allied aircraft since tanks and trucks are very easy to see day or night with modern sensors. On the other hand, CAS of ground troops requires the relatively low and slow eyeballs on target approach.

An A-10 replacement would not need to serve the A-10's cold war mission of tank busting, it would only need to serve the COIN function and, considering the greater vulnerability of that mission and the great political sensitivity to captured or killed US pilots, it needs to serve that function like a flying tank.
 
A few years ago, Scaled Composites built a proof of concept demonstrator for the Army. It was effectively a scaled down A-10. The single engine was mounted on one side and the gun would be on the other. As a proof of concept demonstrator, it was smaller than the actual production plane would be but the design could be up-scaled. It never really gained any traction, in part due to the restrictions on the Army having fixed wing attack aircraft. The ARES did however prove to be difficult to track with AA systems because of it's small size and relatively high speed and maneuverability.--View attachment 300547-View attachment 300548
I hope outside the box thinkers like Scaled Composites are involved in the NEW aircraft that needs to be designed to replace the A-10 if that path is deemed to be more economical or better than just upgrading the A-10s:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II#Upgrades
 
I recall that when I worked on A-10s (late '70s and early '80s) they didn't have an autopilot. When the pilots from our squadron in Nevada deployed to Europe, they set up bungee cords to hold the control stick steady.

Greg
 
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