Space Ship Two crashes during test flight

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A hybrid engine loses thrust when the oxidizer (n2o) stops flowing into the combustion chamber.

Did the pilot sense something wrong after ignition and attempt to turn off the engine?
What there a structural failure of the tank or valving that caused the Nitrous to vent into the airframe then ignite?
Did this leak cause a large loss of pressure in the tank allowing the combustion chamber gases to flow into the N2O tank?

The third photo in that sequence doesn't show much of any heat in that explosion (no warm or flame colors) as compared to the exhaust before the explosion. Could that explosion just be a nitrous plume?
 
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Below is another photo of the accident. Of the three-photo image I posted in message #28, this photo happened after the middle image but before the last image. In this one you can see a lot of debris, and the tailbooms not too far from the rest of the ship.

- George Gassaway

PmLfebV.jpg
 
Lest we forget why we do these things.

[video=youtube;4ErkeFA-QWk]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ErkeFA-QWk[/video]
 
Did it go boom due too the rocket motor or did it fail due to fatigue on the materials used. Let's not forget it was made from composite and not all last for ever.

A great loss to a long project that's has lots of set backs. Total loss of life so far is 4 with manny injured over its course of development.

Brandon is supporting it still and on his way there.

Bad week for space travel.

RIP to the brave, super skilled pilot.
 
It is very sad that one person died and another was injured. Burt Rutan is undeniably arrogant though, and I'd be investigating the test & certification program.

Rutan is retired.


Mark Koelsch
Sent from my iPhone using Rocketry Forum
 
I wonder how many people will now drop off their waiting list.
 
According to parabolicarc, there was a visible engine fire and then it basically ripped apart:

https://twitter.com/spacecom/status/528320460916658176

I was going post that too, good find.

At the end of this I'll paste a very relevant portion of that story which was written on October 30th, the day before the accident.

Rutan may be retired, but his decisions for Space Ship Two painted the program into a corner when it turned out that rocket science is , well, rocket science, not just brilliant aerodynamic design.

BTW - the change to a plastic fuel is not all that occurred. In May when they announced the change, they also fired the company that had made their original rubber HTPB engine and went with their own in-house engine. So this threw much of the previous test results, reliability data, and technical expertise from that engine out the window.

A the press conference, they referred to the change to plastic fuel as a "nuance" and nothing more. They dumped the original engine company, and went with their own engine, that's not a "nuance", that's a drastic change.

I recommend reading whole thing.

- George Gassaway


https://www.parabolicarc.com/2014/10/30/apollo-ansari-hobbling-effects-giant-leaps/


But, there was a deeper, more fundamental problem that Rutan wasn’t even aware of, one that has bedeviled the program to this day.
SpaceShipOne had reflected Rutan’s strengths in designing radical flying machines. The use of lightweight but strong carbon composites and the unique feathering system for re-entry were innovative. They represented major advances over the X-15 rocket plane that had flown suborbital missions 40 years earlier.
In terms of its propulsion system, SpaceShipOne was actually a step backward. The X-15 had used the XLR-99, a sophisticated bi-propellant liquid engine that could be throttled, restarted and used multiple times. It was complicated and prone to failure; one blew up on Scott Crossfield during a static test, destroying the vehicle but sparing the pilot’s life.
Rutan steered away from liquid engines; he viewed them as being overly complicated and possessing too many failure modes. Instead, he developed a novel hybrid motor that used nitrous oxide (laughing gas) to burn a large chunk of rubber fuel. SpaceShipOne was the first time a hybrid engine had been used in human spaceflight.
The hybrid worked well enough for SpaceShipOne. However, the motor ran rough, shaking the ship due to the uneven burning of the rubber. On one flight, the pilot heard a loud bang and feared the ship’s tail had been blown off. It turned out to be a chunk of rubber that had shot out the nozzle. The tail was still there.
The hybrid also was expensive because the rocket casing containing the rubber and the attached nozzle needed to be replaced after each flight. Like the space shuttle, the partially reusable nature of SpaceShipOne drove up operating costs and complexity. It was like driving a car from Mojave to Los Angeles and back, and then installing a new engine before making the trip again.
After the Ansari X Prize, some people tried to convince Rutan to replace the hybrid with a reusable liquid engine. He rejected the advice. Rutan came out of SpaceShipOne’s short flight test program believing the hybrid engine was simple and safe, and that it could be easily scaled up for the much larger SpaceShipTwo. He was wrong on both counts.
The first belief was shattered on a hot summer afternoon of July 26, 2007. Scaled engineers were conducting a cold flow of nitrous oxide that did not involve igniting any fuel. Three seconds into the 15-second test the nitrous tank burst, resulting in a massive explosion that destroyed the test stand and killed three engineers. Three others were injured.

Scaled Composites test stand after a nitrous oxide explosion.
Explosions are not unusual in engine development. However, it is rare that anyone dies in them. Safety procedures call for the evacuation of personnel to a safe area before any tests begin. That was not done in this case; the dead and injured were part of a group of 11 people standing near the test stand.
Following the accident, Rutan and Scaled Composites claimed ignorance. “The body of knowledge about nitrous oxide (N2O) used as a rocket motor oxidizer did not indicate to us even the possibility of such an event,” Scaled said in a press release. The media and Scaled supporters have largely parroted this explanation.
A team of experts experienced in working with nitrous oxide reviewed the accident and disputed the claim. “This would seem to indicate either a lack of due-diligence in researching the hazards surrounding N2O (negligence) or a wilful disregard of the truth,” they concluded.
Whatever Scaled’s culpability, there is no dispute the accident delayed the program significantly. Work on SpaceShipTwo was put on hold while engineers investigated the cause of the explosion. Hybrid engine tests would be delayed for nearly two years.
Once engine tests began again in April 2009, engineers would discover that Rutan’s other assumption was wrong. The hybrid engine just didn’t scale very well. The larger the engine became, the more vibrations and oscillations it produced. As engineers struggled to find a solution, Scaled Composites and Virgin Galactic quietly began work on alternative motor designs.
The failure of the hybrid to scale led to another problem. SpaceShipTwo had already been designed and built. The dimensions of the ship, the size of the passenger and crew cabin, the center of gravity…all those were already set. So, engineers now had to fit an engine within those parameters that could still get the vehicle into space.
This is the reverse of how rocket planes are typically designed. Engineers figure out the engine first and then build the ship around what it can do. Rutan – a novice in rocket propulsion who had hit a home run with SpaceShipOne – got the process backward, resulting in years of delays. This failure would cause numerous headaches.

SpaceShipTwo fires its engine on third powered test flight.
The rubber hybrid engine did get a workout in three flight tests, but the vibrations and oscillations it produced were so severe the motor couldn’t be fired for more than 20 seconds. The engine was sufficient to get SpaceShipTwo through the sound barrier, but it couldn’t get the vehicle anywhere near space.
It was not until May 2014 – after spending nearly a decade on the program, and a reported $150 million on engine development – Virgin Galactic announced it would be switching to a different type of hybrid engine, one powered by nitrous oxide and plastic. They are hoping for much better performance in flight.
By then, Rutan was gone, long since retired to a spread in Idaho. It was for others to make the new engine work and fix the mistake he had made.
Flight tests with the plastic engine are set to begin shortly. It remains unclear whether the new engine will get SpaceShipTwo above the Karman line at 100 km (62 miles), which is internationally recognized boundary of space. Ten years after SpaceShipOne, its successor might not be able to replicate what its predecessor achieved.

- See more at: https://www.parabolicarc.com/2014/1...ing-effects-giant-leaps/#sthash.ceZY4DyY.dpuf
 
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Rutan may be retired, but his decisions for Space Ship Two painted the program into a corner when it turned out that rocket science is , well, rocket science, not just brilliant aerodynamic design.

It certainly does sounds like he made a bad decicision to try to scale the hybrid motor and build the entire design around that, without knowing if the motor was scalable. It proved to not be reliable at larger scale, and now they are screwed trying to find a motor that will fit into an already designed craft.

Rutan is retired, but I also wonder how much of his personality and decision-making style are still at work within the culture of the company. He is a genius, but my impression is he is also arrogant and a risk taker. A person like that and a like-minded team can accomplish a lot, and often the risks will pay off. But sometimes risks result in disaster, and maybe those aren't the same people you would want in charge of making a commercial spacecraft for the public.
 
Motor didn't explode, but could their have been other malfunctions. Cockpit video shows the copilot feathering the tail boom early.
Could he have been trying to save it or just an error?
 
Motor didn't explode, but could their have been other malfunctions. Cockpit video shows the copilot feathering the tail boom early.
Could he have been trying to save it or just an error?

What cockpit video? Got a URL for that?
 
Just watched a report from the head of the NTSB...

Telemetry showed that the "lock" lever for the tail feathers unlocked during thrust phase. This allowed the tail to move into "feathered" configuration, during thrust, without the pilot moving the "feather" lever.

We all know what happens when you turn an airframe sideways in a Mach+ airstream.

Ooops.

Back to the drawing board.
 
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Just watched a report from the head of the NTSB...

Telemetry showed that the "lock" lever for the tail feathers unlocked during thrust phase. This allowed the tail to move into "feathered" configuration, during thrust, without the pilot moving the "feather" lever.

We all know what happens when you turn an airframe sideways in a Mach+ airstream.

Ooops.

Back to the drawing board.
The lever was activated by the pilot at Mach 1 instead of at Mach 1.4 which was supposed to be the procedure. It's not know if that caused the breakup, but it sure seems to be.

[video=youtube;vjYVhGvUSNc]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjYVhGvUSNc[/video]
 
I doubt that the telemetry said the pilot moved it. It just said it moved. We don't know. Yet.

But we DO know what happens when you turn an airframe sideways at Mach plus, don't we?

Just ask the SONY people. They know, too.
 
I doubt that the telemetry said the pilot moved it. It just said it moved. We don't know. Yet.

Onboard video shows one of the pilots moving the lever to the "unlocked" position. By itself, that would not trigger deployment of the "feathered" configuration. There's no indication of either pilot actually flipping the switch to change the configuration. So, right now, it looks like a combination of the safety lock being released too early followed by something going wrong mechanically.

-- Roger
 
Since this is a private enterprise I can’t help but wonder what this accident and loss of life is going to do to the company’s insurance costs.

Not to mention possible lawsuits by the deceased co-pilots survivors.

This is the world we live in folks.
 
Since this is a private enterprise I can’t help but wonder what this accident and loss of life is going to do to the company’s insurance costs.
And their passenger waiting list.
 
Onboard video shows one of the pilots moving the lever to the "unlocked" position. By itself, that would not trigger deployment of the "feathered" configuration. There's no indication of either pilot actually flipping the switch to change the configuration. So, right now, it looks like a combination of the safety lock being released too early followed by something going wrong mechanically.

-- Roger

Well, if he did that, then he made a boo-boo, didn't he?

Feathers go up, tail goes down. Tail goes down, nose goes up.

Sideways at Mach plus.

If that happens with your high power rocket, go get a garbage bag and a shovel. Cuz ya need 'em.
 
Well, if he did that, then he made a boo-boo, didn't he?

We don't know for sure yet. All we know is that one of the pilots unlocked the safety lever early. We don't know why nor are we certain that it was a partial cause of the accident (though it seems that way so far).

-- Roger
 
Pilot who unlocked the lock is dead.

Unlkocking does not move the tail.

The tail did, however move. This is probably an "uncommanded" movement. If the tails had remained locked, they would not have moved.

Why they moved is the big question.

Hybrid motor functioned perfectly according to reports. it was recovered intact with no signs of failure or burn through.
 
Remember, unlocking your front door does not "open" the front door. if you leave the door locked, nobody can open it unless they break it open.

They unlock the tails so that later on they can be commanded to feather - when they are above the atmosphere where the forces are too great. I am not sure if the altitude where they hit mach 1.4 is that much higher with the air thin enough to not present a problem, but - AGAIN - unlocking at mach 1.4 is not the same as commanding the tails to feather.

"unlcok" does not mean they are free to flop around. They still have a control mechanism.
 
Onboard video shows one of the pilots moving the lever to the "unlocked" position. By itself, that would not trigger deployment of the "feathered" configuration. There's no indication of either pilot actually flipping the switch to change the configuration. So, right now, it looks like a combination of the safety lock being released too early followed by something going wrong mechanically.

-- Roger
To add to what Roger and the head of the NTSB said, the known facts are: 1.) the copilot flipped the feather interlock switch from the locked to the unlocked position at just over Mach 1, approximately 9 seconds after separation, and 2.) there is no evidence, either video or telemetry, to indicate that either pilot activated the feather mode, but the feather mode did activate about 2 seconds after it was unlocked and this action ultimately resulted in the destruction of the spacecraft.

It was stated the proper procedure was to flip the feather mode switch from locked to unlocked when the vehicle past Mach 1.4 (however it was not stated when this should occur, by this I mean on ascent or on descent). (One might assume that the feather deployment code would have some type of time and velocity check to confirm that the time and velocity for crossing Mach 1.4 before proceeding even if the feather mode enable switch was activated early however NTSB has not yet examined the feather deployment code.)

The NTSB statement also reported that motor operations were normal up to the time when the premature feather event occurred. The telemetry and the videos did not indicate a motor problem. No explosive event occurred, and the recovered debris evidence shows that all tanks and the motor chamber were intact and did not rupture.

Feathering normally occurs after apogee to set up reentry, long after the motor has been shut down. In the feather mode the two principal opposing forces are gravity and drag: The vehicle is aerodynamically stable in a high drag mode, and is not very sensitive to small changes in angle of attack, similar to a badminton shuttle cock. If the feather mode is initiated during powered flight, thrust is a third force that must be accounted for. When the feather mode is initiated, the immediate reaction of the vehicle would be to pitch up, and if the motor is burning, the off-axis thrust will cause the vehicle to tumble end over end, and the tumble rate would rapidly increase until either the a boom, the elevator or the wing fails from the combined aerodynamic and high g forces from the off-axis motor thrust. This appears to be what happened.

While the NTSB believes they know what happened, they are careful to state they do not know the root cause of the accident. Was it pilot error, improper training, a part failure, a bug in the computer code? They do not know why the accident occurred and that finding the root cause will take months of study and simulations.

Bob
 
While the NTSB believes they know what happened, they are careful to state they do not know the root cause of the accident. Was it pilot error, improper training, a part failure, a bug in the computer code? They do not know why the accident occurred and that finding the root cause will take months of study and simulations.

This is another example of why those in the business of flight understand that the story isn't over until it's over. Almost everyone here was ready to jump all over the new engine, Scaled Composites, and Rutan on day one without any actual knowledge of what happened.

Uninformed speculation has tarnished people, companies, and machines past the point of recovery.

FC
 

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